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Privacy and Personhood Revisited:
A New Framework for Substitute
Decisionmaking for the Incompetent,
Incurably I11 Adult*

Linda C . Fentiman"*

Introduction
This is an essay about the nature of human personhood in a modern, socially and technologically complex society. Its focus is the
incompetent,' incurably ill2 adult3, and the question of how, and by
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1. "Incompetent," for purposes of this Article, is defined to mean incompetent to
make a medical treatment decision. While this would obviously include an individual in
a coma or in a persistent vegetative state, it also encompasses many patients who,
although conscious, suffer from confusion or delusion, alternating with periods of lucidity, due to serious illness, pain, or pain medication. See, e.g, State Dep't of Human
Servs. v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197, 207-10 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).
There is no universally applicable standard for incompetency because the test of incompetency must necessarily depend on the purpose for which the incompetency determination is being made. Applebaum & Roth, Competency to Consent to Researc/z: A
Psychiatric Overview, 39 ARCHIVES
GEN.PSYCHIATRY
951,956 (1982). Thus, it is not useful
to talk about global incompetency; rather, a person may be incompetent to make a will,
or to manage his financial affairs, or to make a medical treatment decison, without necessarily being incompetent to conduct many other aspects of daily living. Stromberg &
Stone, A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the ~bfentalbIll, 20 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS.275,
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Heinonline - - 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.

801 1988-1989

801

whom, medical treatment decisions for that adult should be made.
Fundamentally, this essay seeks to identify both the justification for,
and limits of, state power over the individual in the area of health
care decisionmaking, and to define a sphere within which the individual, as a member of the human family, may choose the direction
of his life and death.
As we near the end of the twentieth century, we face a troubling
paradox. At the very time that modern medical technology makes it
possible to extend and sustain human life almost indefinitely, two of
the most essential attributes of that life-individual self-determination and the sharing of human connection-have been placed in
jeopardy. Gone are the days when dying was a frequent event in
everyday life, striking young as well as old, with its inevitability being a respected and accepted fact of human e ~ i s t e n c e .Today,
~
perhaps because death is less common, it is more feared,5 and indeed,
one might argue that the ever-increasing armory of modern antideath weaponry is itself testimony to our collective fear of death.
In the last two decades, organ transplants, organ repairs (such as
coronary bypass operations), and organ substitutes (such as respirators, ventilators, and renal dialysis machines) have, along with the
development of major pharmacological treatments for a number of
classic diseases of old age, made it possible to greatly extend the
average person's life span. Currently, twelve percent of all Americans are over age sixty-five and twenty percent are expected to be so
by the year 2030.6 Furthermore, the fastest growing segment of the
elderly are those over seventy-five, who are much more likely than
301 (1983); see also Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 494-95, 495 N.E.2d 337, 342, 504
N.Y.S.2d 74, 79 (1986) (holding that the fact that appellant was mentally ill and involuntarily civilly committed was insufficient in itself to establish a lack of competence to
make a medical treatment decision (citing Brooks, Constitutional Right to Refuse Antipsychotic ~Medications,8 BULL.AM.ACAD.PSYCHIATRY
& L. 179, 191 (1980))). The definitional problems of "incompetency" are compounded because it is both a medical and
legal term that is often used with very different meanings by practitioners in these two
fields.
2. "Incurably ill" is used in this essay to identify not only those patients who have
traditionally been labeled as "terminally ill," such as those suffering from a form of
cancer for which no known cure exists, but also to describe those persons for whom
death or a permanent loss of consciousness is reasonably medically certain, although not
imminent. Persons in this category include stroke victims who have been in a coma for a
long period of time and persons who are in a persistent vegetative state. For examples
of such individuals, see infra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
3. The focus of this essay is limited to incompetent, incurably ill adults. No discussion of the special ethical problems surrounding decisionmaking for seriously ill children, including newborns, will be attempted here.
4. Thomas, Dying As Failure, 447 ANNALS1, 2-4 (1980), reprinted in J. AREEN,P.
& A. CAPRON,
LAW, SCIENCE
AND MEDICINE
1077, 1078-80 (1984)
KING,S. GOLDBERG
& MEDICINE].
[hereinafter LAW, SCIENCE
5. Id.
6. John Beck, Epidemiology, Demography, and General Principles, Paper
presented at Intensive Course in Geriatric Medicine and Board Review, American College of Physicians, in Beverly Hills, California 1 (Jan. 19-23, 1988) (copy on file at the
George IVmhington Law Review); 3 M. PERLIN,MENTAL
HEALTHLAW: CIVILAND CRIMINAL
5 18.03 (forthcoming 1989) (citing Farber, Petrakis & Bernadette, The Health Status Of the
Older Population, in 1981 WHITEHOUSECONFERENCE
ON AGING,REPORT
OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE
ON HEALTH
MAINTENANCE
& HEALTHPROMOTION
1).
Interestingly, about half of the elderly are concentrated in just eight states: California,
Heinonline - - 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
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younger individuals to suffer from chronic disease and disability.7
When these elderly do die, they most often do so in an institutional
setting-a hospital or nursing home-where complex and often
highly invasive medical technology may be employed in an effort to
stave off death as long as possible.8
For these individuals, the spectre is raised of a life in limbo. The
phenomenal accomplishments of modern medical technology have
made it possible for previously active adults to be incapable of any
cognitive, sentient interaction with their environment or other
human beings, but to have their biological and corporeal lives sustained indefinitely.9 At the same time, there are increasingly large
numbers of people who are incurably ill, but whose death, as defined by current medical and legal criteria,lO is not imminent."
Reflecting on this possibility of a "high-tech" death, many people
are afraid that when the moment of their own death nears, they will
Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. John Beck, supra,
at 2.
7. John Beck, supra note 6, at 1. As long ago as 1968, one study of chronic diseases
found that "half of the deaths were from conditions diagnosed at least twenty-nine
months earlier." Childress, ReJ&.sal ofLifesauing Treatment by Adults, 23 J. FAM.L. 191, 194
SICKNESS
AND SOCIETY
307 (1968)).
(1984-85) (citing R. DUFF& A. HOLLINGSHEAD,
More and more, the question is being raised of whether the "life" that ought to be
protected at all costs includes mere biological and corporeal existence, or whether we
can distinguish what is particularly human, and therefore sacred, from simple physical
ISexistence. See, e.6, Engelhardt, Medicine and the Concept of Person, in CONTEMPORARY
SUES IN BIOETHICS
94, 94-99 (T. Beauchamp & L. Walters 2d ed. 1982) (arguing that
"human life has more than one meaning and that there is more than one sense of human
person," and that important medical consequences flow from this recognition), reprinted
& MEDICINE,
supra note 4, at 1067-72.
in part in LAW,SCIENCE
8. More than 80% of Americans over age 65 die in an institutional setting. In
recent years, the percentage of those dying in hospitals has decreased, from 65 to 61%
over the period from 1981 to 1985, while those dying in nursing homes has increased,
from 19 to 21.5% during the same period. Boston Globe, Feb. 16, 1989, at 87, col. 1; see
COMM'N
FOR THE STUDY
OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS
IN MEDICINE
& BIOMEDIalso PRESIDENT'S
CAL & BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH,
DECIDING
TO FOREGO
LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT
17-18
(1983) [hereinafter COMM'N
REPORT];M. PERLIN,
supra note 6, 3 1803 (citing Kovar, Elderly People: The Population 65 Years and Over, in U.S. DEPT.OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION,
AND
WELFARE,
HEALTH:UNITEDSTATES1976-1977 at 3 (1977)).
9. Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 584 (D.R.I. 1988). The longest reported period of a patient being maintained in a comatose state is 37 years. COMM'N
REPORT,
supra note 8, at 177 n.16.
10. A number of stares have adopted the 1968 "Harvard criteria" for death, which
identify brain death, as determined by several factors, as the crucial test of non-life ver& MEDICINE,
supra note 4, at 1064-65; Black, Definitions of Brain
sus life. LAW,SCIENCE
ISSUES
IN DEATH
AND DYING
5 , 6 ('r.Beauchamp & S. Perlin eds. 1978).
Death, in ETHICAL
By 1986, more than 40 states had adopted some group of neurological criteria for death,
&A. CAPRON,
LAW,
either by statute orjudicial decision. J. AREEN.P. KING,S. GOLDBERG
SCIENCE
& MEDICINE
208 (Supp. 1987).
11. At any one time, as many as 10,000 Americans are in the long-term unconscious
condition known as a persistent vegetative state. See infra note 18; see also Brophy v. New
England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417,421-27 & nn. 4 & 6,497 N.E.2d 626, 628-31 & nn.
4 & 6 (1986) (discussing at length the definition and physical consequences of being in a
persistent vegetative state).
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be unable to make choices concerning it. As Seneca declared nearly
two thousand years ago, "Just as I choose a ship to sail in or a house
to live in, so I choose a death for my passage from life. . . . Nowhere
should we indulge the soul more than in dying."I2
Ironically, in the past twenty-five years there have been a number
of judicial decisions announcing both a constitutiona113 and common law right to privacy,l4 including the right, under certain circumstances, to refuse all life-sustaining15 medical treatment.16
12. Seneca, Suicide, in THESTOICPHILOSOPHY
OF SENECA
202, 204 (M. Hadas trans.
1968).
13. E.g.,Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 484-86 (1964).
14. A right to privacy, inherent in the right to be free from invasion of one's bodily
integrity, has long been recognized at common law, both as a right exproprio vigore and as
an aspect of the right to be free from the tort of battery, an unconsented touching. See,
e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 738-39,
370 N.E.2d 417,424 (1977) ("There is implicit recognition in the law . . . that a person
has a strong interest in being free from nonconsensual invasion of his bodily integrity.");
Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 21 1 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92,93 (1914) (Cardozo, J.) (recognizing a competent adult's right to determine what will be done to his
body, and that medical treatment without the patient's consent is a battery).
15. Life-sustaining medical treatment is used here to mean any medical treatment
that substitutes for a normal bodily function in a way that sustains life. It includes not
only such obvious examples as respirators, kidney dialysis machines, cardiopulmonary
resuscitation, and organ transplantation, but also treatment with antibiotics and the provision of food and hydration by such means as intravenous feeding or a nasogastric tube.
Whether artificial means of supplying food and water should be defined as medical
treatment that can be withheld or withdrawn under the same circumstances as any other
medical treatment is the subject of intense controversy at present. In 1986 the American Medical Association (AMA) adopted a revised ethical opinion indicating that the
artificial provision of nutrition and hydration should be viewed as medically and ethically
comparable to other forms of medical treatment. See COUNCIL
ON ETHICAL
AND JUDICIAL
AFFAIRS,
AMA, CURRENT
OPINIONS
5 2.18 (1986) [hereinafter AMA COUNCIL].The underlying view here is that, " '[flood and water should always be provided when they are
needed for patient comfort, but when . . . all it does is lengthen the terminal period
without adding comfort, . . .it may be more beneficial to withhold nutrition and hydration.' " Childress, supra note 7, at 212 (quoting Dr. Virginia Keeney). However, a vocal
minority of critics of this position, led by Dr. Mark Siegler and Attorney Alan J.
Weisbard, contends that artificial methods of providing food and water are sui generis,
and should not be withheld or withdrawn as a matter of general medical practice, both
because of their emotional significance as symbols of compassion and caring and because of a concern that permitting the withholding of food and water from the incurably
ill is but the first step down the slippery slope of withholding nourishment from "the
severely senile, the pleasantly senile, the retarded, . . . and perhaps, the aged." Siegler
& Weisbard, Againsf the Emerging Stream: Should Fluids and Nutritional Support Be DiscontinINTERNAL
MED. 129, 130-31 (1985).
ued?, 145 ARCHIVES
16. The right to refuse medical treatment has been recognized during the past 30
years as an important aspect of a patient's right to participate in the medical decisionmaking process, frequently denominated the right to give informed consent to medical
treatment. E.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393,406-07,350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960).
More recently, the right to refuse medical treatment has been asserted by involuntarily
committed mental patients, who have sought, with some success, to refuse treatment
with antipsychotic drugs. See Rennie v. Kiein, 653 F.2d 836, 844 (3d Cir. 1981) (en
banc), vacafed and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), reaff 'd on olher grounds, 720 F.2d 266
(3d Cir. 1983); Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 497-98, 495 N.E.2d 337, 343-44, 504
N.Y.S.2d 74, 81 (1986); Rogers v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Mental Health, 390
Mass. 489, 497, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314 (1983).
A specific right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment has been recognized by an
increasing number of state courts as an important aspect of the constitutional and common law rights to privacy. The landmark case of In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10,355 A.2d 647,
cut. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), was one of the first in the nation to address this
Heinonline - - 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.

804 1 9 8 8 - 1 9 8 9

[VOL. 57:801

Privacy and Personhood
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

However, the combination of advanced medical technology, increasing judicial involvement in the protection of individual liberties, and
the rising tide of medical malpractice litigation1' has led to a situation in which the goal of private, personal decisionmaking about the
manner and timing of one's death often exists more as a matter of
abstract legal principle than as a practical reality.
The time has come for a reexamination of traditional approaches
to thinking about death, and, in particular, the process by which we
reach decisions about terminating medical treatment. The thesis of
this Article is that there are two major aspects of human personhood
that must be central to our thinking in this area. The first is that of
individual autonomy and privacy: the fundamental principle that
each person should be the architect of her own destiny, both because this is an inalienable human right and because, as a practical
matter, she is in the best position to know her own needs and
desires. Thus, substitute decisionmaking for an incompetent adult
should seek to respect and promote that individual's right to autonomy and privacy, both by seeking to effectuate his medical treatment
choice, to the extent that it can be determined once he is no longer
competent, and by providing a sphere for private decisionmaking by
that individual, his family, and his physician, into which the state
cannot intrude.
The second fundamental aspect of human personhood, which has
been virtually ignored by courts and commentators, is that each individual is a member of a community: we are human precisely because we can interact, communicate with, and care for other people.
Thus, we are individuals in a web of relationships and connectionsbetween spouses, between parents and children, within a family, and
within a community.
Regrettably, most recent writing about decisionmaking for the incompetent, incurably ill patient has focused solely on the patient's
right to autonomy, and indeed, on one particular aspect of that autonomy-the
ability to refuse treatment. Because this writing
troubling area. More recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court has sought to answer
some of the questions left open in Q i n l a n in: In re Farrell, 108 N.J.335, 529 A.2d 404
(1987), In reJobes, 108 N.J. 394,529 A.2d 434 (1987), In re Pel&, 108 N.J. 365,529 A.2d
419 (1987), and In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court has also recognized a constitutional and common law right to
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass.
417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,
373 Mass. 728,370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). Numerous other state courts have reached similar conclusions. E.g,Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 130,
482 A.2d 713,717-18 (Super. Ct. 1984);In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 120-21,660 P.2d
738, 742 (1983); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980); Leach v. Akron
Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 8-9, 426 N.E.2d 809, 814 (C.P. 1980).
THE
FREQUENCY
AND SEVERITY
OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS
1-3,
17. P. DANZON,
7-8, 36-38 (1982).
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neglects the need to preserve and promote the relational aspects, of
human personhood, it is seriously incomplete.
This Article is thus an exploration of the essentials of the human
personhood in community, both the intimate community of family and
close friends and the larger, more impersonal community of hospitals and health care providers, courts, legislatures, and lawyers. After undertaking an analysis of the sources of the autonomy model
for decisionmaking in this area and the negative consequences of an
exclusive reliance on that model, this Article will propose a new
moral, legal, and medical framework for making medical treatment
decisions for incompetent incurably ill adults. This model both provides maximum opportunities for each individual to determine for
himself, without state interference, whether, and under what circumstances, he should receive life-sustaining medical treatment. Simultaneously, it recognizes that because all individuals are persons
in community, decisionmaking in this area must promote and respect the connectedness of the human family by providing incentives and opportunity for conversation and compassion.

I.

The Problem: The Incompetent, Incurably Ill Patient and the
Risk of Erroneous Decisionmaking

T o understand fully the problem of decisionmaking for incurably
ill, incompetent adults we must examine first who they are, and second, the issues that make decisions in this area so problematic.
Perhaps the most famous example of a person suffering a prolonged dying is Karen Ann Quinlan, the young woman who, for reasons unknown, suffered brain damage and lost consciousness,
remaining in a persistent vegetative stateIs for almost ten years
before she died.19 In the seminal case of In T e Quinlan,*O Quinlan's
father persuaded the New Jersey Supreme Court to appoint him as
his daughter's guardian in order to act as a surrogate and exercise
her constitutional right to privacy. The court held that this right
encompassed the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment
under the particular circumstances of this case.
More recently, much attention has been given to the case of Paul
Brophy, a Massachusetts fire fighter who suffered a cerebral aneurysm and lost c o n s ~ i o u s n e s s .As
~ ~a result of his stroke, Brophy entered a persistent vegetative state, unable to swallow and thus to
ingest food. T o keep him alive, Brophy's doctors surgically implanted a gastrostomy tube that provided him with nutrition and
18. Persistent vegetative state is the neurological condition that occurs post-coma,
in which the autonomic nervous system continues to function after the cognitive functioning of the mind has ceased. Altman, Il'hen the ~LfindDies Buf [he Brain Lives On,N.Y.
Times, Nov. 17, 1987, at C3, col. 5. In 1986, there were estimated to be 10,000 patients
in a persistent vegetative state. Wallis, To Feed or Not to Feed?, TIME,March 31, 1986, at
60.
...
19. Karen Ann Quinlan lived for five years after her father was permitted to exercise
her right to refuse treatment.
20. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cut. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
21. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986).
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hydration.22 Ultimately, Brophy's wife persuaded the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court to act as a substitute decisionmaker on
Brophy's behalf. The court determined that Brophy would have
elected not to receive medical treatment under these circumstances,
and accordingly, authorized the removal of the gastrostomy tube.23
Less well-known than Quinlan and Brophy, but much more numerous, are those people, frequently elderly, suffering from incurable cancer, emphysema, strokes, and countless other degenerative
diseases who eventually are so debilitated by illness, advancing senility, or necessary pain medication that they become incapable of
.communicating with others about their treatment desires.Z4 Because any number of medical complications can be life-threatening
for these individuals, the question is frequently raised as to whether
continued aggressive medical treatment is a p p r ~ p r i a t e . ~ ~
Each of these cases raises profound medical, moral, and legal issues. Because the individual is incompetent, incapable of presently
making a decision to accept or reject medical treatment, someone
must make a decision on her behalf. But who should that decisionmaker be, and what approach should she employ in making the
decision?
Historically, and to a large extent still today, decisions to treat or
not treat the incurably ill, incompetent patient were made by the
~~
patient's physicians, or her family, or the two in ~ o m b i n a t i o n .But,
often today, doctors and families are seeking the assistance of the
courts to act either as the decisionmaker in the first instance, or as
the arbiter of last resort. Many physicians are refusing to discontinue life-sustaining medical treatment without judicial authorization, due either to their own sense of professional ethics or to the
fear of civil or criminal liabilit~.~'
At the heart of the ethical conundrum raised by these cases is the
22. Id. at 421, 497 N.E.2d at 628.
23. Id. at 441-42, 497 N.E.2d at 639-40.
24. See Munetz, Lidz & Meisel, Infonned Consent and Incompetent Medical Patients, 20 J .
FAM.PRACTICE
273,275-77 (1985); Hilfiker, Allowing the Debilitated to Die, 308 NEWENG.J.
MED.716, 717 (1983).
25. See, e.g., Hilfiker, supra note 24, at 717 (suggesting that doctors frequently make a
subconscious decision not to provide "maximal possible care" to incompetent, terminally ill patients).
26. See In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 552, 531 N.E.2d
607, 626, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 905 (1988) (Simons, J., dissenting); In re Conroy, 98 N.J.
321, 345,486 A.2d 1209, 1227 (1985).
27. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417,497 N.E.2d 626 (1986);
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); cf: Barber v.
Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983). Barber is apparently
the only reported American murder prosecution based on a physician's withdrawal of
life support systems. The Barber case was brought against physicians who, at the direction of a patient's family, disconnected all his life-support systems after he had suffered a
post-surgery cardio-respiratory arrest that led to severe and permanent brain damage.
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collective judgment of our society that human life and human personhood are sacred and must be zealously protected. When this belief is combined with the obvious reality that a decision to withhold
life-sustaining treatment is irrevocable, it leads to a fear of error in
deci~ionmaking*~
that may become paraly~ing.~"
The awareness of
this risk of error, and the possibility of abuse in a substituted judgment process, currently pervades much of the judicial and other
writing in this area.30
Although the circumstances of each individual patient are of
course unique, there are three major factors that contribute to the
risk of an improper decision being made. These are, first, the risk of
an erroneous medical diagnosis of the patient's condition; second,
the risk of an erroneous medical assessment of the patient's prognosis, even with a correctly diagnosed condition; and third, the risk
that a substitute decisionmaker might erroneously assess the patient's treatment wishes.
There is limited data available about the frequency of medical
misdiagnosis or prognosis,31 but most readers will be aware of some
evidence that suggests that this is at least a minimal risk.32 A
number of courts have implicitly recognized the possibility of
28. Whether it is a more egregious error to choose death for an incompetent person
who would have opted for even a limited life, or to choose life for a person who would
have preferred immediate death to a long and painful struggle is, of course, a question
that can only be answered by resort to one's personal values and beliefs.
29. A distinguished group of American physicians has commented:
Fear of legal liability often interferes with the physician's ability to make the
best choice for the patient. Assessment of legal risks is sometimes made by
lawyers whose primary objective is to minimize liability, whether real or
imagined. Unfortunately, this may be done at the expense of humane treatment and may go against the expressed wishes of the patient o r family.
Wanzer, Adelstein, Cranford, Federman, Hook, Moertel, Safar, Stone, Taussig, & van
Eys, The Physician S Responsibility toward Hopelessl~Ill Patients, 3 10 NEWENG.J. MED.955,
956 (1984) [hereinafter Physician? Responsibility]. Of course, the fear of legal liability
should not be invoked as an excuse for avoiding the hard choices that both adulthood
and professional responsibility place upon all of us.
30. For example, Justice Lynch's dissenting opinion in Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hospital states: "A substituted judgment standard is our best legal tool to divine individual intent and to protect autonomous choice. But it would be an error of great magnitude to conflate a substituted judgment with an actual judgment." 398 Mass. at 448,497
N.E.2d at 643.
3 1. Physician 5 Responsibility, supra note 29, at 956.
32. As President Derek Bok noted in his 1983 report on medical education to the
Harvard Board of Overseers:
[Mlany studies have revealed that doctors make a disturbing number of major diagnostic errors. For example, a recent survey of 100 autopsies at a
prominent teaching hospital disclosed such mistakes in 22 percent of the
cases. In almost half of these instances, a correct diagnosis would have indicated a change in the treatment that might have prolonged life.
Bok, XEEDED: A new way to train doctors, HARV.MAG.32, 39 (May-June 1984) (copy on
file at the George ltrmhington Law Rmiew) (citing Goldman, Sayson, Robbins, Cohn,
Bettman 8: Weinberg, The l'alue of the Autopsy in Three ilfedical Eras, 308 NEWENG.J. MED.
1000 (1983)). Bok also noted that many internists frequently neglected routine "high
yield" diagnostic tests:
[A] survey of 249 patients in the outpatient clinic of a teaching hospital revealed that internists often neglected simple high-yield procedures such as
examining the prostate or asking for a urinalysis (omitted 20 percent of the
time), ordering blood-sugar analysis (omitted 30 percent of the time), and
testing the stool for blood (omitted 40 percent of the time).
H e i n o n l i n e - - 57 Geo.
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mistaken diagnosis or prognosis, either by requiring the patient's
condition to be concurred in by additional physicians,33 by calling
for an "ethics committee" to evaluate the likely prognosis of a patient in a persistent vegetative state,34 or by requiring that evidence
of the patient's hopeless prognosis and diagnosis be "clear and convincing," the highest civil standard of proof.35 Many "natural death
acts" recognize this risk by requiring two or more physicians to certify that a patient suffers from a "terminal condition" before the patient's attending physician can discontinue life-sustaining
treatment.36
In addition, although physicians may agree on a general prognosis for a particular patient, predicting the precise moment of an impending death is extremely difficult.37 Thus, in cases in which a
prognosis that a patient has only a few months to live may lead to a
call for less aggressive treatment than would be afforded a patient
who had a year or more to live, the risk that a prognosis of a very
short life expectancy will become a self-fulfilling prophecy is
apparent .38
Yet perhaps the most significant concern about erroneous decisionmaking stems from the inherent inability of a substitute decisionmaker to know with certainty the incompetent patient's own
wishes.39 Here, the most common scenarios are that: (1) the decisionmaker has no information about the patient's values and prioriId. (citing Goetzl, Cohen, Downing, Erat &Jessiman, Quality ofDiagnostic Examinations in a
INTERNAL
MED.481 (1983)).
University Hospital Outpatient Clinic, 78 ANNALS
33. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321,384,486 A.2d 1209, 1242 (1985); In re Bany, 445 So.
2d 365,372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 137,660 P.2d 738,
751 (1983); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 132,482 A.2d
713, 721 (Super. Ct. 1984).
34. Caber, 99 Wash. 2d at 134-35,660 P.2d at 749; In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,54,355
A.2d 647. 671. cerl. denied. 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
35. I; re ~ d b e s ,108 N.J. 394,407-08,'529 k.2d 434,441 (1987); see Leach v. Akron
Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 11, 426 N.E.2d 809, 815 (C.P. 1980).
36. See, e.g, IOWACODEANN.$ 144A.5 (1987) (requiring another physician to confirm the attending physician's determination of a "terminal condition").
37. CO~IM'N
REPORT,
supra note 8, at 25. Indeed, "[elxcept in patients who were
very ill and had short prognosis [sic] of three to four months, survival was consistently
underestimated." Aiken & Man, Hospica: Peupectiva on the Public Policy Debate, 37 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST
1271, 1275 (1982), quoted in COMM'N
REPORT,
supra note 8, at 25 11-44.
38. Pearlman, Inui & Carter, Variability in Physician Bioethical Decision-making: A Case
INTERNAL
MED.420 (1982), cited in COMM'N
REPORT,
supra
Study ofEuthanasia, 97 ANNALS
note 8, at 25 n.44.
39. Even in the case of a competent patient, it is often difficult to know whether the
person is making a carefully thought-out and voluntary decision to reject all or certain
types of medical treatment, or is acting, at least in part, on the basis of depression or a
belief that others wish the patient to choose death. R. BURT,TAKING
CAREOF STRANGERS: THE
RULEOF LAW IN DOCTOR-PATIENT
RELATIONS
6-7 (1979); Beschle, Autono~nous
Decisionmaking and Social Choice: Examining the "Right to Die'', 77 KY. L.J. 319, 354-58
(1988-89).
The importance of exploring a patient's apparent wishes in some detail, and through
the process of conversation, is emphasized in Jackson & Youngner, Patient Autonomy and
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ties in the matter of life-sustaining treatment, because the patient
has never expressed any opinion on the question of refusing such
t~-eatment;~O
(2) the decisionmaker has some information about the
patient's desires, but is not sure how to apply that information to
the actual medical situation confronting the patient;41 and (3)
whatever the information the substitute decisionmaker does have
about the patients wishes is viewed, consciously or not, through the
lens of the decisionmaker's own self-interest, biases, and values.. Indeed, such potential for distortion of the patient's wishes, even if
they could be fully known, is inevitable, given the reality that it is
not the decisionmaker's own imminent death that she is called upon
to choose.42
Thus, whenever the family of an incompetent person asserts a
right to make the decision for him, the possibility exists that the
family's claim that the patient had previously declared a wish "to die
with dignity7' is merely masking the family's wish to see the patient
dead, either because of dislike, or avarice, or to end the drain on the
family's dwindling financial and emotional resources.43 Indeed,
when the patient is incompetent, then it is at least arguable that it is
the family's, rather than the patient's, privacy interest that is at
stake, because the patient is neither aware of the offensive intrusion
into her body nor the notoriety that her case may be evoking.44
Conversely, a family, or one of its members, who asserts that the
"Death With Dignity," 301 NEWENG.J. MED.404,407 (1979), r@.nfed in LAW, SCIENCE
&
MEDICINE,
supra note 4, at 1127, 1132. Jackson and Youngner write:
Physicians . . . must be alert not to let the possibility of abuse keep them
from the appropriate exercise of professional judgment. Physicians who are
uncomfortable or inexperienced in dealing with the complex psychosocial
issues facing critically ill patients may ignore an important aspect of their
professional responsibility by taking a patient's or family's statement at face
value without further exploration or clarification.
Id. For further discussion of the need for conversation in decisionmaking for the incompetent incurably ill, see Section 111, infra.
40. E.g.,In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363,380,420 N.E.2d 64, 72,438 N.Y.S.2d 266,275,
cot. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
41. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 428, 497 N.E.2d 626,
632 (1986); In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 340, 486 A.2d 1209, 1218 (1985) (involving a
senile and confused nursing home patient sustained by a nasogastric feeding tube,
whose nephew declared, "[alll [Ms. Conroy and her sisters] wanted was t o . . . have their
bills paid and die in their own house." (alterations by the court)).
42. In his recent article, Donald Beschle writes powerfully about our inherent inability either to accurately predict how we will feel when our own death is imminent or to
meaningfully stand in the position of another and assess the choice that person would
make when faced with the reality of incurable illness. Beschle, supra note 39, at 341-46.
43. In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 130, 660 P.2d 738, 747 (1983).
44. M. Hayes, Remarks during the Law, Science, and Medicine Seminar, Suffolk
University Law School (Spring 1988). Others, however, have argued that an important
aspect of the right to privacy is the present peace of mind that one feels when assured
that one's wishes will be carried out even if one is not in a position to be aware of it, just
as one feels more secure after having signed a will that one's minor children will be
cared for and one's property will be disbursed in accordance with that document.
Cantor, Conroy, Best Interests, and the Handling ofDying Patients, 37 RUTGER~
L. REV.543,
556 (1985). Further, "[slome languishing patients, though not sufficiently aware to
make a competent medical decision, may have enough awareness to sense and appreciate relief when painful, intrusive, or embarrassing care is withdrawn in accordance with
his or her prior instructions." Id.
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patient wanted all possible treatment provided, might be reflecting
the decisionmaker's own fear of dying, or a religious view that life
must be prolonged at all cost, or even a perverse satisfaction in seeing the patient suffer.
Similarly, in the case of the physician decisionmaker, the physician's aggressive treatment may reflect his own fear of death and
dying, his concern with demonstrating professional competence,45
or his desire to generate a large fee. Or, in exactly the same situation, with the same patient statements, a different physician might
argue against treatment, because the physician views her role as one
of easing suffering and comforting the dying when sustaining life is
no longer possible,46 or because she needs an intensive care unit
bed for a patient with a more hopeful prognosis.
These same risks of unconscious value bias apply to the judicial
decisionmaker as well. For the judge, every bit as much as the physician or family member, there is the possibility that his retrospective assessment of the incompetent patient's wishes will be colored
by his own fears of an existence in limbo, a life that he might not
deem worth living. Thus, in In re Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme
Court seemed to validate Quinlan's father's exercise of her right to
refuse medical treatment in part because "the overwhelming majority [of society] would, we think, in similar circumstances, exercise
such a choice in the same way for themselves or for those closest to
them."47 Although both the New Jersey Supreme Court and other
courts have subsequently eschewed any suggestion that they were
making decisions based on the "quality" of the patient's life28 it is
naive to suppose that any decision of this nature can be totally divorced from the values of the decisionmaker.
Indeed, over the past twelve years, many courts have easily dismissed what would seem to be an enormous state interest in the
preservation of life.49 Remarkably, they have often concluded, even
-

45. Physician's Responsibility, supra note 29, at 956; see Jaretzki, Death with Dignit)Passive Euthanasia, 76 N.Y. ST. J. MED.539. 541 (1976).
46. In its most recent pronouncement on this aspect of medical ethics, The American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs declared in pertinent
part:
The social commitment of the physician is to sustain life and relieve suffering. Where the performance of one duty conflicts with the other, the choice
of the patient, or his Family or legal representative if the patient is incompetent to act in his own behalf, should prevail. In the absence of the patient's
choice or an authorized proxy, the physician must act in the best interest of
the patient.
supra note 15, at § 2.18 (Withholding or Withdrawing Life-Prolonging
AMA COUNCIL,
Medical Treatment).
47. 70 N.J.10, 41-42, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976).
48. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 434, 497 N.E.2d 626, 635
(1986); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 335, 486 A.2d 1209, 1226 (1985).
49. Brophy, 398 Mass. at 433-34, 497 N.E.2d at 635; Conroy, 98 N.J. at 348-49, 486
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in the absence of significant evidence of what an incompetent individual would have chosen, that his privacy interest in terminating
medical treatment is param0unt.5~ Many courts forthrightly acknowledge the difficult moral and ethical terrain they are traversing
and the agonizing nature of the decisions that they have been called
upon to make.51 Nonetheless, some critics charge that this apparent
solicitude for individual liberty masks impermissiblejudicial choices
based upon the quality of a patient's life,52 and that such decisions
launch us onto an ethical slippery slope that will soon lead to the
active killing of a large number of socially undesirable individuals.53
Judicial activism on behalf of the incompetent has been severely criticized as "paternalism masquerading as the mere ratification of autonomous choice."54
The danger, of course, no matter who the de~isionmaker,5~
is that
what purports to be a concern for death with dignity is translated in
fact into a lack of concern for the person who is dying. Respect for
individual autonomy can translate quickly into abandonment,
whether intended or n0t,~6as has often been the case with the
A.2d at 1226; In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 122, 660 P.2d 738, 744 (1981); Satz v.
Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162, 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), af'd, 379 So.2d 359
(Fla. 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
741-42, 370 N.E.2d 417,425-26 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10,40-41, 355 A.2d 647,
663-64, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
50. See infra notes 146-214, and accompanying text. At the same time, however,
some courts have refused to follow this trend, rigorously applying the requirement of
"clear and convincing" evidence to err on the side of preserving life. E.6, In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531,531 N.E.2d 607,613, 534 N.Y.S.2d
886, 893-94 (1988); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 379, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d
266, 274, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). For insightful discussions of the inherent
difficulty in meeting the standard of "clear and convincing" evidence, see the concurring
and dissenting opinions in Westchter County Medical Center, and Rhoden, Litigating Life
and Death, 102 HARV.L. REV.375, 377, 390-91 (1988).
51. See, e.g., In re Jobes, 108 NJ. 394, 446, 529 A.2d 434, 461 (1987); Brophy, 398
Mass. at 419,497 N.E.2d at 627; Conroy, 98 N.J. at 334, 486 A.2d at 1220.
52. Beschle, supra note 39. at 348-50.
53. In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987).
54. Brophy, 398 Mass. at 448, 497 N.E.2d at 643 (Lynch, J., dissenting in part).
55. These risks of erroneous diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment choice exist
equally in the "substituted judgment" model and the theoretically more objective "best
interests of the patient" approach. Under both models, the decisionmaker's own biases,
and the lack of access to complete information, combine to make the ultimate decision
fraught with uncertainty. Under the "substituted judgment" approach, the decisionmaker attempts to put herself in the patient's position and make the choice that the
patient would make if he could temporarily become capable of choosing a course of
treatment, considering his incompetence as one of the factors bearing on that decision.
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 752-53, 370
N.E.2d 417,430 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10,39,355 A.2d 647,663, cerl. denied, 429
U.S. 922 (1976). Under a "best interests" approach, the decisionmaker attempts to determine what course of treatment would be superior, using ostensibly objective criteria
to evaluate the impact of disparate treatments.
Yet in the case of incompetent patients, the distinction between these two standards
must, of necessity, blur, because any assessment of what an incompetent person would
choose if he were competent will inevitably include data based upon the choices of a
reasonable person in the incompetent's present condition. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 39-40,
355 A.2d at 663-64.
For an illuminating exploration of the deficiencies of both the "substituted judgment"
and "best interests" approaches, see Rhoden, supra note 50, at 380-419.
56. Competent patients who have chosen to be allowed to die may experience a
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deinstitutionalization of the civilly committed mentally i11.57
This danger is a particular concern with nursing home patients,
who are often socially and medically isolated, and can be subject to
abuse by underpaid caretakers in an impoverished and often dangerous environment. Such patients usually suffer from a complement of chronic, progressively degenerative diseases, frequently
~ ~ cognitive imaccompanied by limited cognitive f ~ n c t i o n i n g .This
pairment, coupled with the traditional tendency of the elderly to be
deferential to medical authority, often prevents nursing home residents from asserting their needs.

II.

The Classic A@roach: Autonomy as the Paramount Value

Sources of the Autonomy Model
Over the past dozen years, courts and legislatures have responded
to the agonizing problems posed by substitute decisionmaking for
the incurably ill by exalting individual autonomy as the primary
value to be achieved. This exclusive focus on self-determination,
however, has often led to the denigration of the very personhood
that its advocates claim to be protecting by involving the machinery
of the state in what ought to be a very private, family-centered
affair.59
Yet this reliance on an autonomy model is hardly surprising, because the right of the individual to be let alone, free from government interference, has long been a deeply cherished American
value.60 Its priority as a societal guiding principle is reflected by its

A.

resultant feeling of abandonment after they have made this decision, as physicians and
nurses are no longer displaying maximal, "heroic" efforts to sustain life. "The family
may share this feeling on behalf of the dying patient and have difficulty grappling with
the consequences of a decision in which they may or may not have played a part." Physician's Responsibility, supra note 29, at 957. Abandonment is particularly likely to be the
case of the elderly in nursing homes. This concern is discussed at length by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Conroy, 98 N.J. at 375-77, 486 A.2d at 1237-38.
57. See Lamb, Deinsfitutionalization and the Homehs Mentally Ill, in THEHOMELESS
MENTALLY
ILL: A TASK
FORCEREPORTOF THE AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION
55,
62, 66 (H. Lamb ed. 1984).
58. See Conroy, 98 N.J. at 375-77,486 A.2d at 1237-38; Hilfiker, supra note 24, at 716.
59. It is of course true, as Martha Minow has noted with insight, that labelling the
issue as one of state intervention versus personal privacy can obfuscate, rather than illuminate, the fundamental tensions involved. State intervention can take a variety of
forms, from activejudicial involvement to comprehensive legislation or regulation. The
debate on the appropriateness of a particular action should be addressed on its merits,
rather than through the invocation of political rhetoric. Minow, Bqond State Infewention
in the Family: For Baby Jane Doe, 18 U . MICH.J.L. REFORM
933, 934-37, 946-53 (1985).
60. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
In one of his most eloquent dissents, Brandeis declared that:
[in adopting the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, t]he makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness.
They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings
and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
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prominence in both state and federal constitutions, as well as the
common law. The roots of this libertarian concern may be found in
the writings of the seventeenth century political philosophers who
so heavily influenced the founders of our republic. Thomas Hobbes
and John Locke envisioned government as both necessary, in order
to avoid the hardships of life in a state of nature, which was frequently "nasty, brutish, and short,"61 and ~ o n s e n s u a lexisting
,~~
by
virtue of the joint agreement of the citizenry to cede just so much of
their freedom and autonomy as was necessary to ensure a peaceful,
and therefore more productive, society.G3 Drawing upon this vision
of a limited government, and writing against the backdrop of what
were perceived to be a despotic king and a heavy-handed parliament, the Framers of the Constitution created a federal government
of limited and enumerated powers, leaving to the states and "the
people" all powers not specifically granted to the federal
g~vernment.~"
For many years courts did not address the precise scope of this
residual liberty interest, although the principle that it encompassed
freedom to contract received judicial support in the heyday of substantive due process,65and a more intimate, family-centered right to
freedom in personal decisionmaking was recognized in Meyer v.
Nebraska66and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.67 However, in the last quarter century a major judicial revolution has occurred, during which
the principle has been enshrined as absolute that the individual citizen retains a fundamental interest in liberty and privacy that cannot
be intruded upon by the government, whether federal or state, absent a compelling countervailing interest.
In the landmark case of Griswold u. Connectic~t,~~
the Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional a Connecticut statute that made it
criminal to use or prescribe any contraceptive device.69 In so
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
Id., quoted in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
61. T. Hobbes, LEVIATHAN
100, 129 (1651) (Collier (MacMillan) ed. 1962).
62. Id. at 129; J. LOCKE,
TWO
TREATISES
OF CIVILGOVERNMENT,
3 95 (Dent & Sons
ed.' 1924) (1st ed. 1690).
63. J. LOCKE,
supra note 62, $8 99, 123, 131.
64. The Ninth Amendment to the Constitution provides: "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST.amend. IX. The Tenth Amendment provides that:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X. For further discussion of this retained liberty interest of the individual and
role of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments in protecting it, see Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 486-96 (1965).
65. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
66. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
67. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
68. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
69. Id. at 480.
Heinonline - - 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.

814 1 9 8 8 - 1 9 8 9

[VOL. 57:801

Privacy .and P~sonhood
THE GEORGE N'ASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

holding, the Court relied upon the fundamental constitutional right
to privacy, which it found existed in the marital relationship. Citing
the Ninth Amendment, the Court found that certain fundamental
rights are protected by the Constitution even though not specifically
enumerated in the Bill of Rights or subsequent constitutional
amendments.70 Included among these rights is the right to privacy-the right to a sphere of personal thought and action free from
government invasion-which the Court found to be implicit in the
First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth amendment^.^^
Following Griswold, the Supreme Court announced a series of decisions that upheld the right of the individual to be let alone, free
from state intrusion, absent a compelling state interest. These included Stanley v. Georgia,72 which recognized a right to exercise First
Amendment rights in the privacy of one's own home, even if the
material that one was viewing might be deemed pornographi~,~3
and Roe v. Wade,74 which found that the fundamental right to privacy
encompassed the right of a woman to decide to terminate her pregnancy, free from state interference, during the first trimester of
pregnan~y.~5
Following Griswold, Stanley, and Roe, a number of state and lower
federal courts found this fundamental constitutional right to privacy
to encompass the right to refuse medical treatment, drawing upon
both the federal and state constitutional rights to privacy and the
tort law doctrines of battery and informed consent. Aside from
cases in which the patient seeks to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment, this issue has arisen most often in the case of involuntarily committed mental patients, who have sought to refuse unwanted
treatment with psychotropic medication. Generally, such a right to
refuse such medication has been recognized in all except narrowly
defined emergency situati0ns.~6
70. Id. at 482-85, 486-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring), 499-502 (Harlan, J., concurring). Eschewing the notion that it might be calling for a revitalization of the doctrine of
substantive due process, the Court declared:
We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and
propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social
conditions. This law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation of
husband and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of that relation.
Id. at 482.
71. Id at 482-85.
72. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
73. Id. at 565-68.
74. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
75. Id. at 153-54, 164. In enunciating this right of privacy, the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether its source was the personal liberty interest protected
from state intrusion by the Fourteenth Amendment or the "Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the'people." Id. at 153.
76. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacafed and remanded, 458
U.S. 1119 (1982), reaff'd on ofhergroun&, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983); Rivers v. Katz, 67
N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986); Rogers v. Commissioner of the
Heinonline - - 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.

815 1988-1989

Like the cases invoking the federal constitutional right to privacy,
these decisions have emphasized the centrality of individual autonomy and self-determination to their analysis. For example, in Rivers
v. K a t ~ the
, ~ New
~
York Court of Appeals relied upon the common
law action for battery for unauthorized medical treatment and the
state constitutional guarantees of liberty and due process to hold
that civilly committed mental patients have a right to refuse unwanted treatment. The court declared:
[Tlhe right of a competent adult to refuse medical treatment must
be honored, even though the recommended Treatment may be
beneficial or even necessary to preserve the patient's life. . . .
In our system of a free government, where notions of individual
autonomy and free choice are cherished, it is the individual who
must have the final say in respect to decisions regarding his medical treatment in order to insure that the greatest possible protection is accorded his autonomy and freedom from unwanted
interference with the furtherance of his own desires. This right
extends equally to mentally ill persons who are not to be treated
as persons of lesser status or dignity because of their illne~s.~8

This emphasis on individual self-determination and inviolability is
seen more generally in the common law principle that one has a
right to be free from battery-an unconsented touching. Its application to unauthorized medical treatment has had a long history. As
early as Schloendorf v. Society of New York Hospital79 and Pratt v.
Davis, courts have invoked the principle of individual autonomy in
recognizing a cause of action in tort against physicians who performed surgical procedures against the patient's wishes.8'
Today, this concern for patient autonomy receives judicial
Dep't of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 504,458 N.E.2d 308, 318 (1983). Emergencies
are generally defined as situations in which a failure to forcibly medicate the patient
presents a substantial risk of serious harm to others or to the patient himself, including
the risk of an "'immediate, substantial, and irreversible deterioration of a serious
mental illness.' " Rogers, 390 Mass. at 510-1 1, 458 N.E.2d at 322 (quoting Guardianship
of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 441, 421 N.E.2d 40, 55 (1981)).
77. 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986).
78. Id. at 493,495 N.E.2d at 341. 504 N.Y.S.2d at 79 (citations omitted). The highest courts of Massachusetts and New Jersey have employed similar reasoning. In Superintendent of Bekherlown School v. Saikewin, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977), the court
declared:
There is implicit recognition in the law of the Commonwealth, as elsewhere, that a person has a strong interest in being free from nonconsensual
invasion of his bodily integrity. . . . [Tlhe law recognizes the invidual interest in preserving "the inviolability of his person." . . .
Of even broader import, but arising from the same regard for human dignity and self-determination, is the unwritten constitutional right of privacy
found in the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
373 Mass. at 738-39, 370 N.E.2d at 424 (citations omitted); accord Brophy, 398 Mass. at
430-31, 497 N.E.2d at 633-34; Conroy, 98 NJ. at 346-48, 486 A.2d at 1221-23.
79. 21 1 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
80. 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906).
81. In ringing language, Judge Cardozo declared that: "Every human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body;
and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an
assault, for which he is liable in damages." 21 1 N.Y. at 129-30, 105 N.E. at 93. Unfortunately for the plaintiff Schloendorff, her suit against the defendant hospital was barred
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recognition under the doctrine of informed consent. This doctrine
requires that the physician, as part of her fiduciary duty of providing
good medical care, inform her patient both as to what a particular
proposed treatment and its alternatives (including non-treatment)
entail, and the risks and benefits of each.S2 The central, tenet of the
informed consent doctrine is that because of our respect for individual autonomy and self-determination, each patient has the right to
receive all the information necessary for him to make a knowledgeable decision concerning the most appropriate form of treatment.83
The failure to provide such information may give rise to a cause of
action for medical malpracti~e.~4
In the case of incurably ill patients, virtually every state or lower
federal court that has addressed the issue has found that the competent, incurably ill adult does have a right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment unless the state can demonstrate a compelling countervailing interest.85 The only question that has provoked controversy
is whether this right to privacy may be invoked by an incompetent
individual, and if so, how, and by whom.86
Classically, there are four distinct state interests, flowing generally
from the state's role as parens patriae, which have been weighed
against the individual's privacy right. These are: the interest in preserving life, the interest in preventing suicide, the interest in promoting the ethical integrity of the medical profession, and the
by the fact that the trespassing physician was not an employee of the hospital, but rather
an independent contractor rendering his services there.
In Praft v. Davis, the Illinois Supreme Court held that, as a general proposition, a
mentally competent patient's consent is required as a prerequisite to surgery. 224 Ill.
300, 305, 79 N.E. 562,564 (1906).
82. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780-81 (D.C. Cir.), cerf. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 285, 291-92, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308, 311-12,
61 1 P.2d 902, 905-06 (1980); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393,400-12, 350 P.2d 1093,
1099-1108 (1960).
83. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780-81; Natanson, 186 Kan. at 407,350 P.2d at 1104. For
an intriguing and unconventional account of the psychodynamics of the doctor-patient
CAREOF STRANrelationship as they relate to informed consent, see R. BURT,TAKING
GERS 102-04, 107, 119-20 (1979).
84. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 782. There is continuing controversy as to whether the
doctrine of informed consent sounds in negligence or in battery. Sidarvay v. Bethlehem
Royal Hosp. Governors, 1 All E.R. 643 (House of Lords 1985); Katz, Informed Consenf-A
Faity Tale? Law? Vision, 39 U. PI?T L. REV.137, 165 (1977).
85. E.6, Quinlun, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647; Brophy, 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626;
In re Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332,339 (Minn. 1984); Satz v. Perlmutter,
379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
86. See, e.6, Brophy, 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (permitting a guardian ad litem
to assert constitutional rights for an incompetent person); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363,
420 N.E.2d 64,438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (discussing a parent's ability to terminate medical care
for an adult incompetent child), cerf. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Quinlun, 70 NJ. 10,355
A.2d 647 (allowing the father, as legal guardian, to assert his incompetent daughter's
right to refuse treatment).
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interest in protecting innocent third parties.87 Although these interests would appear to be substantial, in virtually every case in which a
guardian or family member of an incurably ill, incompetent patient
has asserted that individual's right to privacy, these four countervailing state interests have not been found ~ o m p e l l i n g .As
~ ~ the
New Jersey Supreme Court declared in In re Quinlan, "as the degree
of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis [for eventual recovery to a cognitive, sapient existence] dims," the state's interests
wane.89 This has been the holding not only in cases in which the
incompetent adult is terminally ill, such as a patient dying of cancer
or of a progressively debilitating neurological disease,gO but also in
the case of individuals like Karen Ann Quinlan and Paul Brophy,
who although unconscious, were not in immediate peril of death.gl

B.

Consequences of the Autonomy Model

Reflecting the high priority our society places upon respect for
individual autonomy and self-determination, in the last dozen years,
courts'and legislatures that have grappled with the problem of decisionmaking for the incompetent incurably ill have developed a variety of substitute decisionmaking alternatives that seek to effectuate
the right of personal choice. These include two vehicles by which a
competent adult can elect in advance the desired treatment approach should she become incurably ill and incompetent-the living
will and the designated treatment agent-as well as several forms of
judicial and less formal decisionmaking that provide for a substitute
decisionmaker to act on the patient's behalf if he becomes incompetent. Each of these alternatives will be explored below.

I . Living Wills
By far the most well-known of the advance directives for substitute decisionmaking are "living wills." Originally proposed by Doctor Louis Kutner in the late 1960s,9* and popularized by such
groups as the Society for the Right to Die and Concern for Dying, a
living will provides a mechanism by which a competent adult can
designate in a legally binding manner the particular treatment or
87. See Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 424-26; Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40-41,
355 A.2d at 663-64.
88. E.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988);Brophy, 398 Mass. 417,497
N.E.2d 626 (1986);John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla.
1984); T o m , 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417;
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647. But see Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408,424 (Mo.
1988) (en banc) (finding that the state interest in preserving life outweighed the privacy
interests of a patient who was in a persistent vegetative state but not incurably ill).
89. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
90. Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 3, 426 N.E.2d 809, 810
(C.P. 1980) (involving a patient suffering from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis).
91. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 18, 355 A.2d at 655; Brophy, 398 Mass. at 425,497 N.E.2d at
630.
92. Martyn &Jacobs, Legislating Advance Directivesfor the Tminally Ill: The Living lRll
and Durable Power of Attorney, 63 NEB.L. REV.779, 787 (1984); see Kutner, Due Process of
Euthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal, 44 IND. L. J. 539,550-54 (1969), cited in Garrard,
Right lo Forego Medical Treatment, 30 RESGESTAE
113 (1986).
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non-treatment that he wishes to receive should he become terminally ill and incompetent. To date thirty-eight states and the District
of Columbia have enacted "living will," "death with dignity," or
"natural death" statutes,93 in part because of the deficiencies of the
judicial model of substitute decisionmaking, discussed below. These
statutes build on the constitutional and common law right to privacy
and individual autonomy, often declaring in a formal preamble that
each individual has a right to choose for himself the appropriate
form of treatment or non-treatmentYg4and that a directive made in
advance by a competent adult shall be binding on her physician and
family if she later becomes incompetent.
Under a typical living will statute, a competent, non-pregnant95
93. These states are: ALA. CODE $9 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984); ALASKASTAT.
$0 18.12.010 to -.I00 (1986); ARIZ.REV.STAT.ANN.$5 36-3201 to -3210 (1986); ARK.
& SAFETY
CODE$3 7185STAT.ANN.$5 20-17-201 to -218 (Supp. 1987); CAL.HEALTH
7195 (Deering Supp. 1988); COLO.REV.STAT.$3 15-18-101 to -1 13 (1987); CONN.GEN.
STAT.ANN.$8 19a-570 to -575 (West Supp. 1988);DEL.CODEANN.tit. 16, $9 2501-2509
(1983); D.C. CODEANN.$3 6-2421 to -2430 (Supp. 1988); FLA.STAT.ANN.$3 765.01765.15 (West 1986); GA.CODEANN.$9 31-32-1 to -12 (1985 & Supp. 1988); HAW.REV.
CODE$$ 39-4501 to -4508 (1986 & Supp.
STAT.$9 327D-1 to -27 (Supp. 1987); IDAHO

1988); ILL.ANN.STAT.ch. 110 1/2, 701-710 (Smith-Hurd 1988); IND.CODEANN.$8 168-11-1 to -22 (West 1988); IOWA
CODEANN.$9 144A.1 to -.I1 (West Supp. 1988); KAN.
STAT. ANN. $0 65-3209 to -3218 (1985 & Supp. 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
$0 40:1299.58.1 to -.lo (West Supp. 1988); ME. REV.STAT.ANN.tit. 22, $0 2921-2931
(Supp. 1988); MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODEANN.,$3 5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1988); MISS.CODE
ANN.$5 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN.STAT.$$ 459.010 to -.055 (Vernon
Supp. 1989); MONT.CODEANN.$9 50-9-101 to -206 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT.ANN.
449.540 to -.690 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1987); N.H. REV.STAT.ANN.$$ 137-H:l to -:16
(Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT.ANN.$5 24-7-1 to -10 (1986); N.C. GEN.STAT.$8 90-320 to
-323 (1985); OKLA.STAT.ANN.tit. 63, $3 3101-31 11 (West Supp. 1989); OR. REV.STAT.
$0 97.050 to -.090 (1987); S.C. CODEANN.$3 44-77-10 to -110 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
CODEANN.$8 32-1 1-101 to -1 10 (Supp. 1988);TEX.
REV.CIV.STAT.ANN.
1988);TENN.
art. 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAHCODEANN.$5 75-2-1 101 to -1 118 (Supp. 1988);
VT. STAT.ANN.tit. 18, $5 5251-5262 (1987); VA. CODEANN.$3 54.1-2981 to -2992
(1988); WASH.REV. CODEANN.$3 70.122.010 to -.905 (Supp. 1989); W. VA. CODE
$5 16-30-1 to -10 (1985); WIS. STAT.ANN.$8 154.01 to -.I5 (West Supp. 1988); WYO.
STAT.$9 35-22-101 to -109 (1988).
Even in jurisdictions that have not enacted a living will statute, such a document will
often be considered persuasive evidence of the now incompetent patient's wishes. See,
e.g., John F. Kennedy Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921,926 (Fla. 1984) (stating that a
living will, if executed while an individual was competent, would be persuasive evidence
of the incompetent individual's intention).
94. A number of living will statutes emphasize that the statute itself does not create
this right to privacy and self-determination, but merely recognizes its existence and
makes it easier to be effectuated. ALA.CODE$ 22-8A-2 (1984); ARIZ.REV.STAT.ANN.
$0 49-701 to -704 (Supp. 1988); CAL.HEALTH
& SAFETY
CODE$ 7186 (Deering Supp.
1987); COLO.REV.STAT.$ 15-18-102(a) (1987); DEL.CODEANN.tit. 16, $ 2502 (1983);
FLA.STAT.ANN.$ 765.02 (West 1986); GA.CODEANN.$ 31-32-1(d) (1985); HAW.REV.
STAT.$ 327D-1 (Supp. 1987); IDAHO
CODE$ 39-4502 (Supp. 1988); IND.CODEANN.
$ 16-8-11-1 (West Supp. 1988); IOWA
CODEANN.$ 144A.1 (West Supp. 1988); LA. REV.
STAT.ANN.$ 40:1299.58.l(A)(l) (West Supp. 1988); N.H. REV.STAT.ANN.$ 137-H:l
(Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN.STAT.$ 90-320(a) (1985); S.C. CODEANN.44-77-10 (Law Coop. Supp. 1988); UTAHCODEANN.$ 75-2-1 102(2) (Supp. 1988); VT. STAT.ANN.tit. 18,
$ 5251 (1987); WASH.REV.CODEANN.$ 70.122.010 (Supp. 1989).
95. The question of the extent to which the state may properly place limitations
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adult may execute a written document, witnessed by two disinterested persons,96 which states that should the declarant later become
terminally ill97 and incompetent, sustained only by "artificial" life
support systems, he wishes not to receive further medical treatment.98 The declarant may indicate a particular form or forms of
treatment which he chooses not to receive, or he may make a more
general statement that he wishes no medical treatment whatsoever.g9 The statutes in many jurisdictions provide a form for the
living wi11,'OO but jurisdictions differ as to whether this form is
--

-

-

upon a pregnant woman's right to control her own body in order to protect the health of
the fetus is a complex and controversial one that is receiving increasing judicial scrutiny
today. See Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 86-90, 274
S.E.2d 457, 458-62 (1981).
96. See, e.g., IND.CODEANN.5s 16-8-11-1 1 to -12 (West Supp. 1988) (providing that
a person who is at least 18 years of age and of sound mind may execute a written living
will, witnessed by two disinterested persons).
97. Only two states-Arkansas and New Mexico-provide for a living will to become
effective in circumstances other than terminal illness. New Mexico provides that a living
will be effective if the declarant is either terminally ill or in an "irreversible coma," defined as "that state in which brainstem functions remain but the major components of
the cerebrum are irreversibly destroyed." N.M. STAT. ANN.5 24-7-2(B) (1986). The
Arkansas statute articulates somewhat broad definitions of "life sustaining treatment"
and "terminal condition," which make it possible for a competent adult to execute a
declaration to become effective if he either "should have an incurable or irreversible
condition that will cause [his] death within a relatively short time" or if he should become "permanently unconscious," defined as "a lasting condition, indefinitely without
change in which thought, feeling, sensations, and awareness of self and environment are
absent." ARK. STAT.ANN.$5 20-17-20 1(4)(a), 20-17-20 1(ii), 20-17-202 (Supp. 1987).
Most statutes define "terminally ill" or "terminal condition"; however, others do not.
Compare ALASKA
STAT.$ 18.12.100 (1986) (" 'terminal condition' means a progressive
incurable or irreversible condition that, without the administration of life-sustaining
procedures, will, in the opinion of two physicians, when available, who have personally
examined the patient, one of whom must be the attending physician, result in death
within a relatively short time") with D.C. CODEANN.5 6-2421(6) (Supp. 1988) (" 'Terminal condition' means an incurable condition caused by injury, disease, or illness which,
regardless of the application of life-sustaining procedures, would, within reasonable
medical judgment, produce death, and where the application of life-sustaining procedures serve only to postpone the moment of death . . . .").
98. Many of the statutory definitions of "terminal condition," "imminent death,"
and "artificial life-sustaining treatment" are interdependent, if not circular. See, e.g.,
DEL.CODEANN.tit. 16, 5 2501 (e) (1983) (" 'Terminal condition' shall mean any disease,
illness or condition sustained by any human being from which there is no reasonable
medical expectation of recovery and which, as a medical probability, will result in the
death of such human being regardless of the use or discontinuance of medical treatment
implemented for the purpose of sustaining life or the life processes.").
99. See, e.g., UTAHCODEANN.5 75-2-1 104 (Supp. 1988) (providing a standard directive form in which the declarant may direct that all life-sustaining procedures be withheld or withdrawn if he is terminally ill, but that life-sustaining treatment does not
include the provision of medication, sustenance, or comfort care, unless specifically so
indicated by the declarant).
100. See, e.g., CAL.HEALTH
& SAFETYCODE5 7188 (Deering Supp. 1988), which provides the follorving mandatory form:
DIRECTIVE T O PHYSICIANS Directive made this -day of -(month,
year).
I
,being of sound mind, willfully, and voluntarily make known my
desire that my life shall not be artificially prolonged under the circumstances
set forth below, do hereby declare:
1. If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease, or illness certified to be a terminal condition by two physicians, and where the application
of life-sustaining procedures would serve only to artificially prolong the moment of my death and where my physician determines that my death is imminent whether or not life-sustaining procedures are utilized, I direct that such
[VOL.
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mandatory or suggested.lo1 Some statutes specifically exclude nutrition and hydration or medication, or both, from the definition of
procedures be withheld or withdrawn, and that I be permitted to die
naturally.
2. In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use of such
life-sustaining procedures, it is my intention that this directive shall be
honored by my family and physician(s) as the final expression of my legal
right to refuse medical o r surgical treatment and accept the consequences
from such refusal.
3. If I have been diagnosed as pregnant and that diagnosis is known to my
physician, this directive shall have no force or effect during the course of my
pregnancy.
4. I have been diagnosed and notified at least 14 days ago as having a terminal condition by
, M.D., whose address is
, and
. I understand that if I have not filled
whose telephone number is
in the physician's name and address, it shall be presumed that I did not have
a terminal condition when I made out this directive.
5. This directive shall have no force or effect five years from the date filled
in above.
6. I understand the full import of this directive and I am emotionally and
mentally competent to make this directive.
Signed
City, County and State of Residence
The declarant has been personally known to me and I believe him or her to
be of sound mind.
Witness
Witness
101. See, e.g., Colorado's suggested, but non-mandatory form:
DECLARATION AS T O MEDICAL OR SURGICAL TREATMENT
I, (name of declarant), being of sound mind and at least eighteen years of
age, direct that my Iife shall not be artificially prolonged under the circumstances set forth below and hereby declare that:
1. If at any time my attending physician and one other physician certify in
writing that:
a. I have an injury, disease, or illness which is not curable or reversible and
which, in their judgment, is a terminal condition; and
b. For a period of forty-eight consecutive hours or more, I have been unconscious, comatose, or otherwise incompetent so as to be unable to make
o r communicate responsible decisions concerning my person; then
I direct that life-sustaining procedures shall be withdrawn and withheld, it
being understood that life-sustaining procedures shall not include any medical procedure or intervention for nourishment or considered necessary by
the attending physician to provide comfort or alleviate pain.
2. I execute this declaration, as my free and voluntary act, this
day of
19-.
Declarant
The foregoing instrument was signed and declared by
to be
his declaration, in the presence of us, who, in his presence, in the presence
of each other, and at his request, have signed our names below as witnesses,
and we declare that, at the time of the execution of this instrument, the declarant, according to our best knowledge and belief, was of sound mind and
under no constraint or undue influence.
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life-sustaining treatment;*o* others are silent on this point.103
Florida, Indiana, and Maryland are the only jurisdictions that provide for the alternative of a binding life prolonging declaration, under
which a competent adult may indicate that should he become terminally ill, he wishes to receive all possible treatment.lo4 Florida, Louisiana, and Virginia also recognize the validity of an oral living will
declaration. lo5
To ensure that a living will is not used inappropriately, legislative
drafters have provided a number of safeguards. Many jurisdictions
require that the document be witnessed by two disinterested persons, who may not be relatives, potential beneficiaries, persons financially responsible for the declarant's medical care, or health care
providers to the declarant.106 All living will statutes require that at
least one, and usually two, physicians certify that the declarant is
terminally ill.lO7 As an additional precaution, all living will statutes
provide for the easy revocation of a living will, either by a written or
oral statement to that effect, or by defacing or obliterating the
will.lOS Although living will statutes are premised on the declarant's
competence at the time the living will is executed, many statutes fail
to require competency at the time of revocation, either implicitly or
explicitly disregarding competency as an issue. log
To provide physicians and other health care providers with an
Dated at

, Colorado, this

day of

,19-.
Name and Address
Name and Address
COL.REV.STAT.3 15-18-104 (1987).
For a helpful discussion of the pros and cons of mandatory versus recommended living will forms, see Marsh, Living Will Legislation in Colorado: An Analysis of the Colorado
Medical Treatment Decision Act in Relation to Similar Dmelopments in Other Jurisdictions, 64
DENVER
U.L. REV.5, 10-11 (1987).
102. See, e.g., UTAHCODEANN. 75-2-1 103(6)(b) (Supp. 1988) (expressly excluding
medication, sustenance or any procedure that provides comfort or alleviates pain from
the definition of life-sustaining procedure, unless the declarant indicates otherwise); see
also AMA COUNCIL,
supra note 15, at 2.18 (defining life prolonging medical treatment
to include the provision of food and hydration).
103. See, e.g., N.M. STAT.ANN.8 24-7-2(C) (1978) (defining "maintenance medical
treatment" as "medical treatment designed solely to sustain the life processes" without
further explanation).
104. FLA.STAT.ANN. 765.02 (West 1986); IND.CODE 16-8-11-11(g), 16-8-11-12
(1984); MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODEANN.$ 5-61 1 (1988).
105. FLA.STAT.ANN. 765.02 (West 1986); LA. REV.STAT.ANN.5 40:1299.58.3(A)(3)
(West 1977); VA. CODEANN. 54.1-2982 (1988).
106. E.g., ALA.CODE 22-8A-4(a) (1984).
STAT.38 18.12.010(a), 18.12.030 (1986); ARIZ.CODE 36-3202(C)
107. E.g.,ALASKA
(1
F)S6).
I---

108:- E.g., FLA.STAT.ANN.§ 765.06 (West 1986) ; see also TEX.REV.CIV. STAT.ANN.
art. 4590h 4A (Vernon 1987) (providing that a competent patient's present desire
shall always supersede a directive).
109. See, e.g., COLO.REV.STAT. 15-18-109 (1987) ("A declaration may be revoked
by the declarant orally, in writing, or by burning, tearing, cancelling, obliterating, or
destroying said declaration."); DEL. CODEANN.tit. 16, 2504(a) (1983) ("A declarant
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incentive to comply with a living will, all living will and natural death
statutes exempt the complying health care provider from criminal
and civil liability for her actions.l10 A physician who feels it ethically
or professionally inappropriate to comply with a patient's living will
must transfer the patient to another physician who will comply.fll
Most statutes, however, provide no sanction for a physician's failure
to comply with an advance directive.112 Only a few states punish a
.cvillful failure to transfer either as a minor crime or an occasion for
professional censure. l3
Living wills have been widely criticized as inadequate to achieve
their laudable goal of promoting individual autonomy and permitting hopelessly ill patients to free themselves from a prolonged and
painful dying. Many patients are unable to take advantage of a living will statute, either because they do not know about it or because
its provisions do not encompass their situation.
Significantly, many physicians are uncomfortable about discussing
death, and may even be reluctant to tell a patient that he is terminally ill. Thus, numerous patients are unlikely to recognize the need
to make a living will, or to have the time to execute it before they
lapse into unconsiousness.l l 4 This is obviously so with accident victims, but it is also so with many people whose chronic degenerative
disease takes a sudden turn for the worse.
Further, even if a patient desires to execute an advance treatment
directive, few physicians have living will forms available. Nor do
many physicians either know, or understand, the requirements of
the living will act in their jurisdiction. 115 Consequently, they are unable to advise their patients, appropriately.
In addition, a number of incurably ill patients are not terminally
i11.116 These include those in a persistent vegetative state, those
may revoke his declaration at any time, without regard to his mental state or
competency.").
110. E.g., ME. REV.STAT.ANN.tit. 22, 5 2927 (Supp. 1985). Some statutes state explicitly that the physician must be acting in good faith in order to invoke this exemption.
E.g., ILL.ANN.STAT.ch. 110-1/2 para. 707 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
111. E.g., HAW.REV.STAT.5 327D- 11(b) (Supp. 1988).
112. E.g., N.H. REV.STAT.ANN.137-H:1-16 (Supp. 1985).
113. See, e.g., ME. REV.STAT.ANN.tit. 22, 5 2928(1) (Supp. 1985) (providing that a
physician who fails to transfer is guilty of a "Class E crime"); IND.CODEANN.5 16-8-1122 (West Supp. 1988) (providing that a physician who knowingly violates his patient's
wishes will be subject to disciplinary sanctions by the state medical licensing board).
114. Note, The Cal$ornia Nafural Death Acf: An Empirical Study of Physicians' Pradices, 31
STAN.L. REV.913, 928, 938 (1979). Only the District of Columbia requires a physician
to inform a patient of his terminal illness, and then only if the patient is alert and communicative. D.C. CODEANN.5 6-2425(b) (Supp. 1983); Martyn &Jacobs, supra note 92,
at 790.
115. Note, supra note 114, at 930-33.
116. At least one commentator has noted the irony that those who fall within the
typical living will statute are the least in need of its benefits. Referring to the California
Natural Death Act, Alexander Capron writes:
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suffering from a chronic degenerative disease, and those suffering
from a condition that is hopeless but not expected to produce death
in the near future."' Further, because of the pervasive use in the
living will statutes of vague and sometimes circular definitions of
such crucial terms as "terminally ill," "imminent death," " 'artificial'
life sustaining treatment," many physicians lack guidance about
whether a particular living will is effective.118 Thus, they may be
disinclined to honor it, or honor it only at the eleventh hour.I1g In a
leading survey of physician practices in California, researchers
found that many physicians defined "imminent death" to mean
death within the relatively short time periods of forty-eight hours,
one week or one month. Although such a definition may be appropriate clinically, reflecting the need for certainty in prognosis, it may
make the beneficial effects of a natural death act illusory to all but a
few terminally ill patients.lZ0
But perhaps the key drawback of the living will is its inherent inflexibility. The essence of a living will is the function it serves as an
advance directive for medical treatment decisions. Yet, it is difficult,
if not virtually impossible, for any adult to indicate with specificity
the types of medical treatment she might wish to forego should she
become incurably ill o r incompetent. This is so both because what
seems like a grave imposition on the quality of life to a thirty year
old might appear to be an entirely reasonable restriction at the age
of seventy,l21 and also because it is difficult to foresee precisely the
type
of incompetency and incurable illness that might occur.lZ2
. If the declarant deals with this uncertainty by drawing a sweeping
living will that refuses all forms of treatment under any circumstances, he takes the chance that this will turn out to be medically
inappropriate, and either dishonored by the physician under a kind
of medical "void for overbreadth" principle, or honored by the physician out of deference to the declarant's autonomy. IZ3 Alternatively,
if the declarant tailors her advance directive to a particular situation,
she runs the risk either that the predicted illness will not materialize,
thus rendering the living will inapplicable, or that her individualiza[Tlhe only patients covered by this statute are those who are on the edge of
death despite the doctors'eforts. The very people for whom the greatest concern
is expressed about a prolonged and undignified dying process are unaffected
by the statute because their deaths are not imminent.
Capron, The Development of Law on Human Death, 315 ANNALS
N.Y. ACAD.SCI. 45, 55
(1978), cited in COMM'N
REPORT,supra note 8, at 143.
117. This group includes those whose prognosis is hopeless but who will not die soon
unless mechanically supplied food and hydration or antibiotics are withdrawn. It is thus
critical to have a clear definition of "artificial" medical treatment.
118. Note, supra note 114, at 920-21.
119. Id. at 920 n.31.
120. Id. at 921 n.38, 932.
121. In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 32 1, 362-63,486 A.2d 1209, 1230 (1985); see ako Hilfiker,
supra note 24, at 718 (comparing different views of what constitutes a reasonable physical limitation on life activities of a person at different life stages).
122. In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 524, 531 N.E.2d 607,
625, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 904 (1988) (Simons, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 537, 531 N.E.2d at 617, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 896 (Hancock, J., concurring).
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tion of the living will renders it unenforceable in her jurisdiction.124
Other procedural safeguards, designed to minimize the risks of an
inappropriate termination of medical treatment in reliance on a living will, often result in preventing the advance declaration from becoming effective when it should. For example, California's
fourteen-day waiting period125 after the diagnosis of a terminal illness means that the living wills of persons who become incompetent
before the fourteen days have passed are not binding, but are advisory only. Automatic expiration periods, like that in California,l26
mean that many people who forget to "renew" their living wills will
find them of no use. And unusual filing requirements, like that of
Mississippi, which requires that all living wills be filed with the
Mississippi Board of Health's Bureau of Vital statistic^,^^^ mean that
the advance directives of many individuals will be rendered
nugatory. 128
Other criticisms of living will statutes come from quite a different
perspective. Some commentators suggest that the blanket elimination of civil and criminal liability may encourage physicians to be
negligent in the diagnosis or prognosis of terminal illnesses, or in
their treatment of the elderly and incompetent.129 Given the difficulty that many patients and physicians have in communicating with
each other, which may lead to the withholding of important inforthere is some ground
mation relevant to diagnosis and prognosisY130
for concern about a blanket exemption.
124. Four states--California, Idaho, North Carolina, and Oregon-have mandatory
living will forms, while thirty-three others have permissive statutes, which only suggest a
standard form of declaration. Two other states-Delaware, and New Mexico-provide
no form at all.
Some statutes directly address the question of the severability of the invalid portions
of a living will from the valid ones, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 3 765.05(2) (West 1986)
("Should any . . . specific direction [other than the designation of a medical treatment
agent] be held to be invalid, such invalidity will not affect the declaration."), although
others are silent on this issue. See, e.g., IOWACODEANN.3 144A.3(3) (West Supp. 1988)
(providing for a living will, but silent as to severability of invalid directions).
& SAFETY
CODE$3 7188, 7191 (Deering Supp. 1988).
125. CAL.HEALTH
126. In California, a living will automatically expires after five years. Id. 3 7188.
127. Vitiello, Death with Dignity in Mississippi? An Analysis of Mississippi's Natural Death
Acl, 54 MISS. L.J. 459,472 (1984) (citing MISS.CODEANN.3 41-41-107(2) (Supp. 1984)).
128. That such an apparently simple procedural requirement can become a substantial obstacle was demonstrated by a survey of attorneys attending a seminar on the Mississippi Natural Death Act. Of the twenty-two lawyers responding to the seminar survey,
only three were aware of the filing requirement, even immediately after the presentation. Id. at 486 n.193.
129. Relman, The Saikewicz Decision: A Medical Viewpoint, 4 AM.J . L. AND MED. 233,
241-42 (1978); Note, The Virginia Natural Death Act-A Crilical Analysis, 17 U . RICH. L.
REV.863, 872-73 (1983).
130. See Branch, Doctors as "Healers'? Striving to Reach Our Potential, 2 J . GEN.INTERNAL
MED.356, 358-59 (1987) (suggesting that difficulties in patient-physician communication often impair physicians' abilities to be accurate in diagnosis and prognosis).
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2.

Designating a Medical Treatment Agent

Acknowledging that living wills are in many ways inadequate, thirteen states have enacted laws that authorize a competent adult to
designate someone to make treatment decisions on her behalf
should she become incompetent131 and, in some cases, terminally
i11.'3* Eight of these states authorize this designation to be made in
the same document that the patient would use to make a living
~ i 1 1 . l However,
~~
Alaska, California, Nevada, Rhode Island and
Vermont, perhaps recognizing the rigidity that inevitably attends
the advance direction of either a blanket refusal of all medical treatment or of specific medical practices, provide for the designation of
a medical treatment agent to be made in a separate document, providing for a durable power of attorney for health care
decisionmaking.
States have adopted a variety of different approaches. Alaska's
unusual statutory scheme permits a competent adult to nominate a
substitute decisionmaker to make medical treatment decisions on
her behalf should she become incompetent, but does not authorize
the treatment agent to seek the termination of medical treatment unless the patient has also executed a living will specifically directing
the refusal of such treatment.135 Both Colorado and Pennsylvania
have enacted durable power of attorney statutes that expressly authorize a principal to designate an agent who can consent to medical
treatment, but appear to preclude the agent from refusing treatment
on the principal's behalf.136 Maine's durable power of attorney statute expressly permits a designated agent to consent to or to refuse
treatment for the principal, but is silent as to whether such a refusal
could be made when the consequence would be the principal's
death.l37 Finally, an additional thirty-three states have enacted
131. ALASKA
STAT.$ 5 13.26.332--356 (Supp. 1988); CAL.CIV.CODE 2410-43 (Deering 1986); DEL.CODEANN.tit. 16, § 2502 (1983); FLA.STAT.ANN.§§ 765.02, 765.05(2)
(West 1986); IOWACODEANN. 144A.7 (West Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
40: 1299.58.1(A)(3)(a) (West Supp. 1988); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 5 449.800-360
(Michie Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS$ 5 23.4.10-1 to -2 (Supp. 1988); TEX.REV.CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 4509h (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODEANN. 75-2-1106 (Supp.
1988); VA. CODE§ 54.1-2984 (1988); VT. STAT.ANN.tit. 14, 3451-3467 (Supp. 1988);
and WYO.STAT.ANN. 35-22-102(d) (1988).
132. The Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Texas, Virginia, and Wyoming statutes provide
that the designation of a medical treatment agent is effective only when the declarant
becomes "terminally ill." T o the extent that this excludes patients who are incurably,
but not terminally ill (see supra notes 97, 107, 114-120, and accompanying text), the
advance designation of a treatment agent suffers from the same weakness as a living will.
133. DEL. CODEANN.tit. 16, 2502 (1983); FLA.STAT. ANN. $3 765.02, 765.05(2)
(West 1986); IOWACODEANN. 144A.7 (West Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
40:1299.58.1(A)(3)(a) (West Supp. 1988); TEX.
REV.CIV.STAT.ANN.art. 4590h $ 3(e)
(Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODEANN. 8 75-2-1 106 (Supp. 1988); VA. CODEANN.
54.1-2984 (1988); and WYO.STAT.ANN. 35-22-102(d) (1988).
134. ALASKA
STAT. $3 13.26.332-.356 (Supp. 1988); CAL.CIV. CODE$ 5 2410-2443
(Deering 1986); NEV.REV.STAT.ANN.$8 449.800-.860 (Michie 1986); R.I. GEN.LA~VS
$ 5 23.4.10-1 to -2 (Supp. 1988); VT. STAT.ANN.tit. 14, $8 3451-3467 (Supp. 1988).
135. ALASKA
STAT.$3 13.26.332, .335, .344(i)(2) and (I) (Supp. 1988).
136. COLO.REV.STAT.8 15-14-501 (1987); 20 PA. CONS.STAT.ANN.8 5603(h) (Supp.
1988).
137. ME. REV.STAT.ANN.tit. 18-A, 5-501 (Supp. 1988).
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durable power of attorney acts that are silent about whether the
principal may appoint an agent to make health care decisions on her
behalf, as opposed to a myriad of other issues affecting the principal's person or property.138 Of these states, only New Jersey has,
through its supreme court, recognized the existing durable power of
attorney statute as an appropriate vehicle for designating a medical
treatment agent.139
State statutes permitting the advance designation of a medical
treatment agent grow out of the same desire to protect the patient's
right to autonomy and personal choice in the making of medical
treatment that underlies the living will, but they achieve their goal
much more effectively. Utah explicitly recognizes this principle of
self-determination, providing that the competent patient will select
a treatment agent "with confidence in the belief that this person's
familiarity with my desires, beliefs, and attitudes will result in directions to attending physicians and providers of medical services
which would probably be the same as I would give if able to do
~ 0 . Similarly.
~ ~ ~ 0
the Florida and Iowa statutes expressly state that
in making their decision, the treatment agent and physician are to
138. ALA.CODE$ 26-1-2 (1986); ARIZ.REV.STAT.ANN.$3 14-5501 to -5502 (1975);
ARK.STAT.ANN.$9 28-68-201 to -203, -301 to -313 (1987); D.C. CODEANN.§$ 21-2081
to -2085 (Supp. 1988); GA.CODEANN.$ 10-6-36 (1982); HAW.REV.STAT.$9 560:5-501
to -502 (1982); IDAHO
CODE$9 15-5-501 to -507 (Supp. 1988); IND.CODEANN.$9 30-211-1 to -7 (West Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT.ANN.$9 58-610 to -617 (1983); KY. REV.STAT.
ANN.$ 386.093 (Baldwin 1983); LA. CIV.CODEANN.art. 3002 (West 1973); MD. EST. &
TRUSTS
CODEANN.$9 13-601 to -603 (1987 & Supp. 1988); MASS.ANN.LAWSch. 201B,
$ 1-7 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988); MICH.COMP.LAWS $ 565.631 (West 1988); MISS.CODE
ANN.$5 87-3-1 to -17 (1972 & Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN.STAT.93 486.550 to -595 (Vernon
1987); NEB.REV.STAT.$3 30-2664 to -2672 (1985); N.H. REV.STAT.ANN.$9 506:5 to :7
(1983 & Supp. 1988); NJ. STAT.ANN.$ 46:2B-8 (West Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT.ANN.
$0 45-5-501 to -502 (1978); N.Y. GEN.OBLIG.LAW 99 5-150 1 to -1601 (Consol. 1987);
N.C. GEN.STAT.$9 32A-1 to -14 (1987); N.D. CENT.CODE$5 30.1-30-01 to -05 (Supp.
1987); OHIOREV.CODEANN.$5 1337.01 to .10 (Anderson 1987); OKLA.
STAT.ANN.tit.
58, $5 1051-1062 (West Supp. 1988); OR.REV.STAT.$9 126.407,413 (1987); S.C. CODE
LAWS ANN.$9 59-7-2.1 to .4
ANN.$ 62-5-501 to -502 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED
(1978); TENN.CODEANN. $5 34-6-101 to -107 (1984); WASH.REV. CODEANN.
$0 11.94.010 to .060 (1987);W. VA.CODE$9 39-4-1 to -7 (Supp. 1988);WIS. STAT.ANN.
9 243.07 (West 1987).
139. In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 378-79, 529 A.2d 419,426 (1987); see infra notes 20106 and accompanying text.
The New York Attorney General has expressed uncertainty as to whether New York's
durable power of attorney could be used to confer broad medical decisionmaking power
on a designated treatment agent. Noting that "section 5-1601 [of the New York General
Obligations Law] and its history do not reflect a legislative intent either to grant or to
deny an agent the power to make health care decisions for an incompetent principal,"
1984 Op. Att'y Gen. N.Y. 58, 59 (1984), the Attorney General suggested that a durable
power of attorney could best be used in a more limited way, like a living will, to "specifically delegate to an agent the responsibility to communicate the principal's decision to
decline medical treatment under certain circumstances." Id. at 60.
140. UTAHCODEANN.9 75-2-1 106 (Supp. 1988).
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be "guided by the express or implied intentions of the patient."141
Indeed, the very fact of designating a treatment agent enhances the
patient's rights of self-determination and privacy in decisionmaking.
Because the competent adult can nominate in advance a person
whom he trusts, and who knows him well, he is given the peace of
mind that comes from knowing that the ultimate treatment decision
will be one that is both consonant with his moral and religious beliefs, and as close as possible to the one that he would have made
himself, because it will be based upon accurate, up-to-date medical
information. 142
The designation of a treatment agent is a significant advance over
the living will, because it provides for intelligent and informed discussion between the treatment agent and the patient's physician.
Because the treatment agent can both provide the attending physician with important background information concerning the patient's health and life habits, increasing the accuracy of the diagnosis
and prognosis made, and can also consider the medical information
conveyed by the physician in light of the totality of the patient's life,
values, and beliefs, she can carefully tailor a treatment decision to
be consistent with the patient's medical and moral needs. The
designation of a medical treatment agent eliminates the risk that the
physician will either refuse to comply with an advance treatment directive that he believes to be too sweeping in scope, or that he will
honor it, no matter what the circumstances.
The designation of a treatment agent is thus an alternative that
promotes conversation, compassion, and caring.143 The attending
physician is not bound to follow reflexively the advance directive of
a living will, but must consult with the patient's designated treatment agent so that the agent may determine a course that is both
medically appropriate and consistent with the patient's values and
desires.
3. Judicial and Less Formal Decisionmaking
A dozen years ago, resort to the judiciary to seek prior authorization to terminate medical treatment of an incomptetent, incurably ill
adult was virtually unknown. In many cases, physicians made these
decisions alone,144 and frequently doctors and family members
made these decisions together.145 It was not until the late 1970s,
141. FLA.STAT.ANN. 8 765-07(1) (West 1986); IOWACODEANN. 5 144A.7(1) (West
Supp. 1988).
142. See Cantor, supra note 44, at 547-48, 555-56. Yet even then the decision that is
made can only be an approximation, a "best guess" as to what the person whose death is
near would choose if he were now competent. See Beschle, supra note 39, at 360.
143. See infra discussion in Section I11 of text.
144. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 47, 355 A.2d 647, 667 (discussing testimonial and
other evidence "that humane decisions against resuscitative or maintenance therapy are
frequently a recognized e'a facto response in the medical world to the irreversible, terminal, pain-ridden patient"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
145. In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 524, 531 N.E.2d 607,
626, 539 N.Y.S.2d 886, 905 (1988) (Simons, J., dissenting); In re conroy, 98 N.J. 321,
345, 486 A.2d 1209, 1227-28 (1985).
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and the paradigmatic cases of In re @inlan146 and Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewin, 14' that the judiciary became actively involved in the disposition of such cases.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Quinlan, and the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in Saikewin, acted on the basis of a shared
constitutional and common law view of the right to privacy.148 They
also agreed on the important state interests that must be balanced
against the patient's right to privacy in determining whether, in a
particular case, the patient may elect to terminate medical treatment
when that will lead her to death: the state's interest in preserving
human life, preventing suicide, maintaining the ethical integrity of
the medical profession, and protecting the interests of innocent
third parties.149 Yet, despite their common starting point, the thinking of these two state courts has evolved very differently, so that the
two courts currently assert conflicting views of the appropriate
means of protecting a person's right to choose the course of his
medical treatment when he is incapable of exercising it personally.
a.

The Massachusetts Model

The Massachusetts substituted judgment model has evolved in a
series of decisions, beginning with the landmark case of Superintenh t of Belchertown State School v. Saikewin
and continuing through
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital. 151 In these decisions, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has taken as its central precept
the fundamental constitutional and common law right to privacy
and self-determination, which it has held must be balanced against
the state interests in the preservation of life, the prevention of suicide, the promotion of the ethical integrity of the medical profession, and the protection of innocent third parties. The court has
consistently rejected the possibility of a nonjudicial substitute decisionmaker, and accordingly, has devised a highly formalized and
complex set of procedures for substitute decisionmaking on behalf
of incompetent, incurably ill adults.
In Saikewin, the patient was a severely retarded sixty-seven-yearold man who had been diagnosed with incurable leukemia.
146. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
147. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
148. Saikewin, 373 Mass. at 739-45, 370 N.E.2d at 424-27; Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 38-42,
355 A.2d at 662-64.
149. Saikewicr, 373 Mass. at 740-45, 370 N.E.2d at 424-27; Quinlan, 70 NJ. at 40-43,
355 A.2d at 663-65. The Quinlan court did not mention the state interest in protecting
innocent parties, presumably because none were involved in that case, but the New
Jersey Supreme Court subsequently recognized all four state interests noted here. In re
Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 348-49, 529 A.2d 404, 410-1 1 (1987).
150. 373 Mass. 728. 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
151. 398 Mass. 417; 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986j.
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Although chemotherapy would normally have been prescribed as a
temporary ameliorative treatment, it would not significantly
lengthen his life. Saikewicz's physicians were concerned that because of his retardation, he would only perceive the pain of the
treatment, without understanding its purpose.15* Because of
Saikewicz's incompetence, a guardian ad litem was appointed to represent him in proceedings brought before the probate court to determine whether treatment should be required. The probate court
determined that treatment should not be ordered, and on appeal,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, articulating
detailed procedures for making medical treatment decisions for the
incompetent.
The court found that the fundamental constitutional and common
law right for a person to be "free from nonconsensual invasion of
his bodily integrity"153 included the right to refuse medical treatment. Because this right is held equally by competent and incompetent people, courts must appoint a guardian to effectuate the
incompetent person's privacy right by clearly articulating the position the guardian believes the incompetent would take if he were
c0mpetent.l5~After a hearing, the trial court must undertake a substituted judgment on the patient's behalf, "attempt[ing] to ascertain the incompetent person's actual interests and preferences. . . .
taking into account the present and future incompetency of the individual as one of the factors which would necessarily enter into the
decision-making pr0cess."l5~
The Saikewicz court strenuously rejected any possibility of a nonjudicial decisionmaker. Although the trial judge might consider the
views of the patient's family, physicians, and any institutional review
committee that might exist, the court stated:
We take a dim view of any attempt to shift the ultimate decisionmaking responsibility away from the duly established courts of
proper jurisdiction to any committee, panel or group, ad hoc or
permanent. . . .
We do not view the judicial resolution of this most difficult and
awesome question . . . as constituting a "gratuitious encroachment" on the domain of medical expertise. Rather, such questions
of life and death seem to us to require the process of detached but
passionate investigation and decision that forms the ideal on
which the judicial branch of government was created. Achieving
this ideal is our responsibility and that of the lower court, and is
not to be entrusted to any other group purporting to represent
the "morality and conscience of our society," no matter how
highly motivated or impressively ~ 0 n s t i t u t e d . l ~ ~

In In re Spring '57 a case involving a seventy-nine-year-old senile
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 734 & n.5, 370 N.E.2d at 421 & n.5.
Id. at 739, 370 N.E.2d at 424.
Id. at 745, 756, 370 N.E.2d at 427, 433.
Id. at 752-53, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
Id. at 758-59, 370 N.E.2d at 434-35.
380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
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incompetent who was receiving life-prolonging kidney dialysis, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court again emphasized the superiority of the judicial model for substitute decisionmaking for incompetent, incurably ill patients. The court held that "it was error to
delegate the decision [to terminate treatment] to the attending physician and the ward's wife and son."l58 Although ostensibly declaring that resort to the judiciary was not necessarily required in every
caseY159the court enumerated such a lengthy list of factors to be
considered in determining whether judicial authorizaton to
terminate life-sustaining medical treatment was requiredl60 that it
virtually ensured that no Massachusetts physician would ever terminate such medical treatment without a judicial imprimatur.
Spring was followed by In re Roe
and Rogers v. Commissioner of the
Department of Mental Health, 162 both decisions addressing the right of
an incompetent mentally ill individual to refuse psychotropic medication.lG3 In each, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court relied
upon the fundamental right of privacy to hold that before someone
can be forcibly medicated with antipsychotic drugs, he must first be
adjudicated incompetent and have a guardian appointed on his behalf. Then, a court will make a substituted judgment for him, considering six factors from the perspective of the incompetent if he
could be temporarily rendered competent: (1) the patient's "expressed preferences regarding treatment," (2) the "strength of the
incompetent patient's religious convictions, to the extent that they
may contribute to his refusal of treatment," (3) "the impact of the
decision on the ward's family," (4) "the probability of adverse side
effects," (5) "the prognosis without treatment," and (6) "the prognosis with treatment."164
158. Id. at 630,405 N.E.2d at 117.
159. Id. at 636, 405 N.E.2d at 120.
160. The cburt declared that there are:
a variety of circumstances to be taken into account in deciding whether there
should be an application for a prior court order with respect to medical
treatment of an incompetent patient. Among them are af leusf the following:
the extent of impairment of the patient's mental faculties, whether the patient is in the custody of a State institution, the prognosis without the proposed treatment, the prognosis with the proposed treatment, the
complexity, risk and novelty of the proposed treatment, its possible side effects, the patient's level of understanding and probable reaction, the urgency of decision, the consent of the patient, spouse, or guardian, the good
faith of those who participate in the decision, the clarity of professional opinion as to what is good medical practice, the interests of third persons, and
the administrative requirements of any institution involved.
Id. at 636-37, 405 N.E.2d at 120-21 (emphasis added).
161. 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981).
162. 390 Mass. 489,458 N.E.2d 308 (1983).
163. In Rogers, the incompetent individuals were civilly committed mental patients at
a state hospital. In Roe, the incompetent was mentally ill and living at home.
164. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 506, 458 N.E.2d at 318-19.
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Most recently, in Brophy a. New England Sinai Hospital, 165 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rendered a substituted judgment
decision on behalf of Paul Brophy, a fire fighter who was in a persistent vegetative state following a stroke. As a result of this condition,
Brophy was unable to swallow, and received food and water through
a gastrostomy tube surgically implanted in his stomach. His death
was not imminent because he could be maintained indefinitely in
that condition.
Brophy's guardian, his wife, sought to exercise Brophy's right to
refuse all life-sustaining treatment, including artificial nutrition and
hydration. When his physicians and the hospital objected, Brophy's
wife brought suit. Relying on Brophy's repeated but general statements that he would never want to be maintained on life-support
systems, which were made while he was competent, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that Brophy's right to self-determination outweighed any competing state interest, even though it
meant that he would die of starvation.166 Although the court disclaimed any intention to make decisions based on the quality of the
incompetent's life,167it repeatedly emphasized the invasiveness of
the gastrostomy tube and Brophy's helpless and demeaning condition. Finessing the question of whether the state's interest in preserving life was paramount to Brophy's autonomy interest, the court
declared:
[W]e must recognize that the State's interest in life encompasses a
broader interest than mere corporeal existence. In certain, thankfully rare, circumstances the burden of maintaining the corporeal
existence degrades the very humanity it was meant to serve. . . .
The duty of the State to preserve life must encompass a recognition of an individual's right to avoid circumstances in which the
individual himself would feel that efforts to sustain life demean or
degrade his humanity.168

Notwithstanding its decision that Brophy had a right to refuse lifesustaining treatment under these circumstances, the court held that
his physicians should not be forced to remove his life-support system when they believed it ethically inappropriate to do so. Accordingly, the court held that the treating physicians should be ordered
to assist in Brophy's transfer to another institution or his home, so
that he could be allowed to die there.169
In sum, the Massachusetts substituted judgment approach takes
as its first precept the principle that an individual's right to privacy
and autonomy can only be protected by the "detached but passionate" judgment of a court.I7O The underlying assumption of this
preference for judicial decisionmaking-that judges, unlike other
mortals, have a direct line to God-represents judicial hubris in the
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986).
Id. at 439, 497 N.E.2d at 638.
Id. at 434. 497 N.E.2d at 635.
Id.
Id. at 439-42, 497 N.E.2d at 638-40.
Saikewia, 373 Mass. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435

.
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extreme. A substituted judgment is just that, no matter who makes
it: a best guess as to what the'incompetent patient would have chosen if he were able to discuss his condition with his doctor and voice
his own treatment preference.171 Any substitute decision must inevitably reflect the biases of the decisionmaker, no matter how hard
she tries to remain "objective" and "detached," or to eschew
decisions based upon the "quality of life."17*
To elevate the substituted judgment to a higher, sacrosanct plane
simply because it is a judge, rather than a family member or physician, who is making the decision, is both presumptuous and ultimately destructive of the very autonomy interest that its advocates
seek to preserve. Judicial proceedings are cumbersome and timeconsuming. They also subject the incompetent and his family to the
glare of the media spotlight, providing an opportunity for this most
intimate of life's dramas to be played out daily in the newspapers
and on the nightly news. In addition, rather than letting the incompetent's family-those persons who are best suited to assess the patient's wishes-deal with the tragedy of a difficult death privately,
with the support of physicians and other health care personnel, the
insistence on a judicial substituted judgment exacerbates the family's emotional upheaval. When resort to the courts is the preferred,
if not the only, means of resolving differences of opinion within the
family or between the family and physicians, it promotes distrust
and the "fracture of human relationship,"l73 rather than dialogue,
understanding, and mutual respect.
b.

The New Jersey Model

From the outset of its involvement in decisionmaking for the incurably ill adult, the New Jersey Supreme Court has expressed a
preference that close family members act as substitute decisionmakers for the incompetent patient. In the landmark case of In
re Quinlan, 174 the court recognized that the competent adult has a
fundamental constitutional right to privacy and self-determination.
Concerned that this right should not be lost merely because the
adult became incompetent, the court declared that this right could
be exercised by a guardian in such cases.175 Further, the court held
specifically that the right to privacy encompassed the right to refuse
171. Substituted judgment has been criticized as a legal fiction, United States v.
Charters, 829 F.2d 479,498 (4th Cir. 1987), vacafed en banc on ofherg-ounds, 863 F.2d 302
(1988), stay granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3545 (1989), inappropriately transferred from one legal
context to another. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408,425-26 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
172. See Brophy, 398 Mass. at 434,497 N.E.2d at 635; Conroy, 98 N.J. at 367,486 A.2d
at 1232-33.
IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE31 (1982).
173. See C. GILLICAN,
174. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cerf. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
175. Id. at. 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664.
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life-sustaining medical treatment when there was no chance of returning to a cognitive and sapient existence.176 Although the court
found that under these circumstances no countervailing state interest could outweigh the patient's right to privacy,177 it was concerned
that a decision to withdraw or withhold medical treatment not be
reached hastily. Therefore, to guard against the risk of an erroneous diagnosis or prognosis, and to ensure the preservation of medical ethics, the guardian would be permitted to exercise the patient's
right to privacy only after her hopeless diagnosis and prognosis had
been confirmed by what the court termed an "ethics committeeMin reality a medical prognosis committee.178 If the committee concurred in the attending physician's diagnosis and prognosis, no
criminal or civil liability would attach to the physician's conduct in
discontinuing treatment. 179 As long as this procedure was followed,
the court emphasized, it would not be necessary to seek prior judicial authorization for decisions to terminate treatment. 180
Eight years later, in In re Conroy, lsl the New Jersey Supreme Court
reexamined the question of substitute decisionmaking for the incompetent in the case of an elderly patient confined to a nursing
home. Claire Conroy was an eighty-four-year-old woman who was
conscious, but senile, displaying extremely limited interaction with
her environment. She suffered from a variety of debilitating illnesses, and, because she had extreme difficulty in swallowing, was
receiving food and water through a nasogastric tube.182 Conroy's
nephew, who was also her guardian, sought to have her feeding tube
removed, believing that his aunt would not have chosen to receive
life-sustaining treatment under such circumstances,l83 although she
had never made an explicit statement to that effect.ls4
In Conroy, the New Jersey Supreme Court reiterated its recognition of a fundamental right to privacy that encompassed the right of
an incompetent, as well as a competent, patient to refuse lifesustaining treatment.185 Although the court stressed that this right
176. Id. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663.
177. Id. at 39-41, 355 A.2d at 663-64. The court declared that, "no external compelling interest of the State could compel Karen to endure the unendurable, only to vegetate a few measurable months with no realistic possibilty of returning to any semblance
of cognitive or sapient life." Id. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663.
178. Id. at 49-51, 355 A.2d at 668-69.
179. This would eliminate any possible conflict of interest or concern about professional liability, which, the court suggested, might be unconsciously influencing the physician's decision to refuse to discontinue medical treatment. Id. at 49-51, 355 A.2d at
668-70.
180. Id. at 50-51, 355 A.2d at 669.
181. 98 NJ. 321,486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
182. Id. at 336-37, 486 A.2d at 1216-17.
183. Id. at 340,486 A.2d at 1218. Conroy's nephew stated that: " '[all1 [Ms. Conroy
and her sisters] wanted was to . ..have their bills paid and die in their own house.' " Id.
(quoting Ms. Conroy's nephew (alterations by the court)).
184. Id. at 389, 486 A.2d at 1244 (Handler, J., concumng in part and dissenting in
part).
185. Id. at 346-50, 486 A.2d at 1221-23. Expanding upon its explication of the
sources of the right to privacy in Quinlan, this time the court grounded the right to privacy in both the federal and New Jersey constitutions and the common law doctrine of
informed consent. Id.
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is not absolute, and. may be outweighed by countervailing state interests,ls6 the court also declared that when the interests of third
parties were not implicated, "the state's indirect and abstract interest in preserving the life of the competent patient generally gives
way to the patient's much stronger personal interest in directing the
course of his own life."l87
The Conroy court then confronted squarely the question of how
decisions should be made on behalf of an incompetent but conscious patient who is hopelessly ill yet not facing imminent death.188
Reiterating its concern, expressed in Quinhn, that this matter was
one most appropriate for legislative action, but feeling impelled to
provide authoritative guidance in its absence, the court articulated
three separate tests to be applied in the case of such an incompetent
nursing home patient.
The first, a subjective test, is consonant with the personal right of
self-determination sought to be effectuated. This test can be satisfied by clear and convincing evidence that the incompetent patient,
while competent, expressed a desire not to receive life-sustaining
medical treatment under the circumstances now existing.189 Such
evidence may be provided by detailed and specific statements to that
effect, either written or verbal, a formal living will,l90 or a durable
power of attorney or other proxy designation of a medical treatment
agent.lgl
For situations in which there is inadequate evidence of the incompetent patient's wishes, the court invoked the parens patriae authority of the state to act humanely to end medical treatment that only
prolongs a painful dying.lg2 The court articulated two standards for
determining whether treatment should end absent evidence of the
patient's wishes: the "limited-objective" test193 and the "pure186. Id. at 348-49,486 A.2d at 1223. Here the court referred to the four state interests traditionally recognized: "preserving life, preventing suicide, safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession, and protecting innocent third parties." Id.
187. Id. at 350, 486 A.2d at 1223.
188. The court limited its holding to the incompetent elderly nursing home patient
who is expected to die within one year even if life-sustaining treatment is continued. Id.
at 342,486 A.2d at 1219. For a discussion of the particular risks of erroneous decisionmaking for nursing home patients, see supra notes 56-58, infra notes 198-200, and accompanying text.
189. Id. at 361,486 A.2d at 1229.
190. The court recognized the evidentiary value of living wills despite the fact that
they were not legislatively authorized. Id. at 361 n.5, 486 A.2d at 1229 n.5.
191. Id at 361, 486 A.2d at 1229-30.
192. Id. at 364-65, 486 A.2d at 1231.
193. The "limited-objective" test is satisfied, and life-sustaining treatment may be
terminated or withheld,
when there is some trustworthy evidence that the patient would have refused
the treatment, and the decision-maker is satisfied that it is clear that the burdens of the patient's continued life with the treatment outweigh the benefits
of that life for him. mhat is, ] that the patient is suffering, and will continue
Heinonline - - 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
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objective" test.lg4 Under these explicitly "best interests" tests, the
substituted decisionmaker may authorize the termination of medical
treatment if the prognosis for the patient's continued existence is
one of extreme pain, not outweighed by any benefits of pleasureable
or satisfying interaction with the environment.195
In so holding, the court took great pains to eschew the notion that
either of these tests would function as a substituted judgment for
the incompetent patient. The court stated that: "[Iln the absence of
adequate proof of the patient's wishes, it is naive to pretend that the
right to self-determination serves as the basis for substituted decision-making."lg6 Rather, the court viewed the parens patriae justification for state involvement as permitting a decision to end medical
treatment that merely prolongs suffering, as long as all doubts were
resolved in favor of continuing life, and no decisions were based on
the patient's "quality of life."l97
Recognizing the social and medical isolation of many nursing
home patients, and the concomitant risks of erroneous diagnosis
and prognosis, the court devised safeguards against abuse. Under
the Conroy framework, if a guardian wishes to make a treatment decision on his patient's behalf, he must first seek a judicial determination of the patient's incompetency to make a treatment decision,
offering the clear and convincing evidence of at least two physicians
who have personally examined the patient.lg8 Each situation in
which a guardian petitions for the termination of life-sustaining
treatment must be treated as a potential case of abuse, to be investigated by the Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly.199
to suffer throughout the expected duration of his life, unavoidable pain, and
that the net burdens of his prolonged life (the pain and suffering of his life
with the treatment less the amount and duration of pain that the patient
would likely experience if the treatment were withdrawn) markedly outweigh
any physical pleasure, emotional enjoyment, o r intellectual satisfaction that
the patient may still be able to derive from life.
Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232.
194. The "pure-objective" test applies in a case where there is no trustworthy evidence of the patient's wishes and
the net burdens of the patient's life with the treatment . . .clearly and markedly outweigh the benefits that the patient derives from life [and] the recurring, unavoidable and severe pain of the patient's life with the treatment [is]
such that the effect of administering life-sustaining treatment would be inhumane. . . . Nevertheless, even in the context of severe pain, life-sustaining
treatment should not be withdrawn from an incompetent patient who had
previously expressed a wish to be kept alive in spite of any pain that he might
experience.
Id. at 366-67, 486 A.2d at 1232.
195. Concumng Justice Handler took issue with the majority's selection of significant
and recumng pain as the decisive factor in evaluating the relative benefits and burdens
of prolonging life. He argued that different individuals may place a higher value on not
being dependent on others o r avoiding intrusive medical treatment o r other intrusions
on one's privacy and dignity, and that these are also important burdens that should be
balanced against the benefit of continued existence. Id. at 392-99,486 A.2d at 1246-50.
196. Id. at 364, 486 A.2d at 1231.
197. Id. at 354, 367, 486 A.2d at 1226, 1232-33.
198. Id. at 381-82, 486 A.2d at 1240-41.
199. Id. at 374-85,486 A.2d at 1237-42. The office of the Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly had previously been created by the New Jersey legislature. N.J.
STAT.ANN.$ 52:27G-3 (1986).
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Further, the Ombudsman must gather evidence from two disinterested physicians, as well as from the patient's attending physician,
all of whom must agree that the patient's diagnosis and prognosis
are hopeless. Then, if the guardian, ombudsman, attending physician and, in a case in which either the limited-objective or pure-objective test is used, the family of the patient, concur, the guardian
may order that the life-sustaining treatment be removed. Unless
bad faith is shown, no participant in the decisionmaking process will
be subject to civil or criminal liability.200
Most recently, in two cases decided in 1987, the New Jersey
Supreme Court refined the substitute decisionmaking process for
incompetent nursing home patients in a persistent vegetative state.
~ court declared that
In the cases of In re Peter201 and In reJ o b e ~ , ~ Othe
such patients, regardless of their life expectancy, would be governed
by its decision in Quinlan rather than Conroy. Recognizing the possibility of neglect and abandonment of nursing home patients, and
thus the need for safeguards against abuse, the court sought to devise a procedure that promoted the patients' well-being and protected them against a hasty or medically incorrect decision to
terminate treatment, "without unduly burdening their rights to selfdetermination and privacy."203
Under this
if there is clear and convincing evidence of an
incompetent patient's actual treatment choice, made while competent, derived either from a living will, a durable power of attorney,204 or formal and unequivocal statements to that effect, the
substitute decisionmaker205 is permitted to authorize the discontinuance of life-sustaining treatment, provided that two neurologists
and the patient's attending physician agree that the patient is in a
persistent vegetative state with no possibility of return to a cognitive, sapient existence. If the nursing home patient is elderly as
well, the Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly must also
concur, after undertaking an independent investigation for possible
abuse.206
If there is no clear and convincing evidence of the patient's
wishes, as was the case in Jobes,207 then a substitute decisionmaker,
200. Conroy, 98 NJ. at 385, 486 A.2d at 1242.
201. 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
202. 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
203. Id. at 427, 529 A.2d at 451.
204. The court found that New Jersey's durable power of attorney statute could be
used as a vehicle for substitute health care decisionmaking, although the statute did not
expressly authorize such a use. Peter, 108 N.J. at 378-79, 529 A.2d at 426.
205. This decisionmaker could be either a person designated by the patient, a close
family member, or a guardian appointed by the court. Id. at 384, 529 A.2d at 429.
206. Id.
207. Mary-Ellen Jobes was a thirty-one-year-old woman who had spent seven years in
a persistent vegetative state following a surgical accident. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 401,
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who may be a close family member208 or a court-appointed
guardian, may nonetheless make a treatment decision on the patient's behalf, based on his evaluation of what the patient would
have wished to be done under these circumstances.209
The NewJersey Supreme Court emphasized its strong preference
that family members, rather than strangers, be the decisionmakers.
Because they "treat the patient as a person, rather than a symbol of
a cause,"210 and because they are " 'most familiar with [the patient's] entire Iife context,' " " 'including his or her philosophical,
religious and moral views, life goals, values about the purpose of life
and the way it should be lived, and attitudes toward sickness, medical procedures, suffering and death,' " they are in the best position
to act as substitute de~isionmakers.2~As in Peter, the court insisted
on the safeguards of an independent medical examination by two
neurologists and the attending physician's concurence in the patient's diagnosis and pr0gnosis.~12
Finally, the court emphasized that judicial review of a decision to
discontinue life-sustaining treatment was ordinarily neither necessary nor desirable:2l3
"No matter how expedited, judicial intervention in this complex
and sensitive area may take too long. Thus, it could infringe the
very rights that we want to protect. The mere prospect of a cumbersome, intrusive and expensive court proceeding, during such
an emotional and upsetting period in the lives of a patient and his
or her loved ones, would undoubtedly deter many persons from
deciding to discontinue treatment. And even if the patient or the
family were willing to submit to such a proceeding, it is likely that
the patient's rights wouId nevertheless be frustrated by judicial
deliberation. Too many patients have died before their right to
reject treatment was vindicated in
c.

Statutes Authorizing Less Formal Decisionmaking

In addition to the judicially developed models for substitute decisionmaking, ten states have, by statute, authorized informal
529 A.2d at 436-38. Although she had made some casual statements over the years
indicating that she would not want to be maintained in a condition like Karen Ann Quinlan, the court found them insufficiently probative of her preferences to meet the "subjective" test of substituted judgment. Id. at 409-13, 529 A.2d at 442-43.
208. T h e court indicated that a near relative, including a spouse, parent, child, o r
sibling, would be presumed to be a close relative, interested in the patient's well-being,
although a physician might also recognize a more distant relative as having a sufficiently
close personal relationship with the patient to act as her substitute decisionmaker. Id. at
419, 529 A.2d at 447.
209. Id. at 399, 529 A.2d at 436-37.
210. Id. at 416, 529 A.2d at 445.
2 11. Id. (quoting Newman, Treatment Refiials for the Critically Ill: Proposed Rules for the
Family, the Physician and ihe State, I11 N.Y.L. S C H . HUM.
RIGHTSANN.45-46 (1985)).
212. Id. at 422, 529 A.2d at 448.
213. The court stated that judicial intervention would be necessary only "[ilf a disagreement arises among the patient, family, guardian, o r doctors, o r if there is evidence
of improper motives or malpractice." Id. at 427-28, 529 A.2d at 451.
214. Id. at 423, 529 A.2d at 449 (citations omitted) (quoting In re Farrell, 108 N.J.
335, 357, 529 A.2d 404, 415 (1987)).
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substitute decisionmaking for incompetent, terminally ill adults215
as part of their "living will" or "natural death" acts. Recognizing
that competent adults have the right to "a peaceful and natural
death,"216 and "to control the decisions relating to their own medical care, including the decision to have life-sustaining procedures
withheld or withdrawn in instances where such persons are diagnosed as having a terminal and irreversible condition,"217 these statutes permit a substitute medical treatment decision to be made even
if the patient has not executed a living will or designated a medical
treatment agent. Each of the statutes provides that the patient's attending physician and at least one other person, usually chosen
from a statutory list in order of priority, shall make the decision to
end treatment. The Florida statute is typi~al:2~8It provides that
life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or withdrawn from an incompetent, terminally ill adult following
consultation and a written agreement for the withholding or withdrawal of life-prolonging procedures between the attending physician and any of the following individuals, who shall be guided by
the express or implied intentions of the patient, in the following
order of priority if no individual in a prior class is reasonably
available, willing, and competent to act:
(a) The judicially appointed guardian of the person of the patient if such guardian has been appointed. This paragraph shall
not be construed to require such appointment before a treatment
decision can be made under this section.
215. ARK.CODEANN.5 20-17-214 (Supp. 1987); CONN.GEN.STAT.ANN. 19a-571
(West Supp. 1988); FLA.STAT.ANN. 765.07 (West 1986); IOWACODEANN.$ 144A.7
(West Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT.ANN. 5 40:1299.58.5(A) (West Supp. 1988); N.M.
STAT.ANN.5 24-7-8.1 (1986); N.C. GEN.STAT. 5 90-322 (1985); TEX.REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN.art. 4590h 4C (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAHCODEANN.3 75-2-1105 (Supp. 1988);
VA. CODEANN.5 54.1-2986 (1988). Of these, both Arkansas and New Mexico provide
that a substitute decision to forego treatment may be made on behalf of a patient who is
either terminally ill or in an "irreversible coma," N.M. STAT.ANN.5 24-7-2(B) (1986), o r
"permanently unconscious," ARK.STAT.ANN.5 20-17-201(ii) (Supp. 1987).
216. N.C. GEN.STAT.5 90-320(a) (1985).
217. LA.REV.STAT.ANN.5 40:1299.58.1(A)(l) (West Supp. 1988).
218. FLA.STAT.ANN.5 765.07 (West 1986).
The Connecticut statute is atypical, providing almost casually for the physician to discontinue life support after consultation with the patient's family. The statute declares
that any licensed physician o r medical facility
which removes or causes the removal of a life support system of an incompetent patient shall not be liable for damages in any civil action or subject to
prosecution in any criminal proceeding for such removal, provided (1) the
decision to remove such life support system is based on the best medical
judgment of the attending physician; (2) the attending physician deems the
patient to be in a terminal condition; (3) the attending physician has obtained the informed consent of the next of kin, if known, or legal guardian, if
any, of the patient prior to removal; and (4) the attending physician has considered the patient's wishes as expressed by the patient directly, through his
next of kin or legal guardian, or in the form of a [living will declaration].
CONN.GEN.STAT.ANN.§ 19a-571 (West Supp. 1988).

19891

Heinonline - - 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.

839 1988-1989

839

(b) The person or persons designated by the patient in writing
to make the treatment decision for him should he be diagnosed as
suffering from a terminal condition.
(c) The patient's spouse.
(d) An adult child of the patient or, if the patient has more
than one adult child, a majority of the adult children who are reasonably available for consultation.
(e) The parents of the patient.
(f) The nearest living relative of the patient.219
A physician who withholds or withdraws treatment after such consultation will not be subject to civil or criminal liability or to censure
for unprofessional conduct.220 AS a precaution against inappropriate discontinuance of medical treatment, nine of the ten statutes require at least one physician in addition to the patient's own doctor
to certify that the patient is suffering from a terminal condition or
irreversible coma, or is being kept alive only by extraordinary medical means.22

III.

Proposal for Conversation in Decisionmaking

The autonomy model of substitute decisionmaking for the incurably ill, incompetent adult, as reflected in both the living will statutes and the decisions upholding the judicial model for substituted
judgment, evidences a one-dimensional mode of analysis. In the
grand vision of the autonomy model it is the individual, armed with
her rights to privacy and self-determination, who is pitted against
the state and her physician. Girded with a Lockean view of government as a social contract, in which only limited powers are ceded to
the state, and wrapped with the magnificent garb of the constitutional right to privacy, these incompetent, incurably ill individuals
are now ready to do battle, to insist that they be able to die "with
their rights on."222
As has been shown, the consequences of this autonomy model are
often devastating. Whether it is the judicial model of decisionmaking, exemplified by Massachusetts, which sanctifies the massive
219. FLA.STAT.ANN.0 765.07(1) (West 1986).
220. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 765.10(1) (West 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
8 40:1299.58.8(A) (West Supp. 1988).
221. Six of the states-Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Texas, and
Utah-provide explicitly for at least two physicians to concur in judgment of the particular medical condition which triggers the operation of the statute. ARK.CODEANN.5 2017-203 (Supp. 1987); LA. REV.STAT.ANN.5 40:1299.58.2(7) (West Supp. 1988); N.M.
STAT.ANN.,§24-7-5 (1986); N.C. GEN.STAT.5 90-322(a) (1985); TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.
ANN.art. 4590h 8 2(6) (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAHCODEANN. 5 75-2-1104 (Supp.
1988). Three states-Florida, Iowa, and Virginia-require such physician concurrence
in the cases of patients who have executed a living will, and one might argue that principles of statutory construction would require at least the same safeguards in the case of
the patient who had not made an advance directive. FLA.STAT.ANN.8 765.03(5) (West
1986); IOWACODEANN. 5 144A.5 (West Supp. 1988); VA. CODEANN. 8 54.1-2982
(1988). Only one state-Connecticut-has
no requirement of physician concurrence.
CONN.GEN.STAT.ANN.3 19a-571 (West Supp. 1988).
1041 (1973) (letter to
222. Treffert, Dying with Their Rights On, 130 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY
LAW, PSYCHIATRY
& THE MENTAL
HEALTH
SYSTEM
690
the editor), reprinted in A. BROOKS,
(1974).
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invasion of courts and the media into the private grief and despair of
families, all in the name of respecting individual freedom, or the
living will statutes, which purport to respect the right to individual
autonomy but often render an attempt to exercise that right illusory,
the autonomy model, with its exclusive emphasis on individual
rights, is fatally flawed. Thus, one must ask if, in addition to individual autonomy, there is not another fundamental aspect of human
personhood that the law must respect and promote: namely, the
fact that we are all persons in community, in a network of connecRather than seeing each person as a
tion and human intera~tion.22~
bundle of rights, it is much more appropriate to view each of us as a
member of the human family, and to rely upon principles of familial
decisionmaking for our moral reference point.
It is axiomatic that in a family, individuals have responsibilities as
well as rights. Family members take care of one another, and in particular, adult family members care for both the young and the very
old. In short, in a family, there is the notion of beneficent paternalism and maternalism. In addition, in many families, it is dicusssion
and conversation, rather than the authoritarian principle, which is
the preferred mode for reaching decisions and resolving difficulties.224 SOtoo in the area of substitute decisionmaking for incompetent, incurably ill adults, the law must provide a structure for
conversations about the treatment choice the incompetent individual
would make if he were able to communicate with us. In the next
section, I propose a model for substitute decisionmaking that takes
into account the need for human connection and compassion, as
well as the rights of privacy and self-determination.
Sources of the Conversation Model
The sources of this model are several. Foremost among them is
Carol Gilligan's book, In a Dzferent Voice, a path-breaking reexamination of moral development in American culture. In her book, Gilligan argues that mature morality is evidenced not only by an
understanding of rights and rules, and the ability to choose among
them according to an established hierarchy, but also by the understanding of responsibility and relationships and the ability to act out
of care and compassion.225
Gilligan urges that difficult ethical dilemmas should be resolved

A.

223. See C. GILLIGAN,
supra note 173, at 19.
224. One would of course be naive to assert that in families all is always sweetness
and light, that individual family members invariably act out of altruism and love, rather
than self interest, or that there is never oppression and dominance, be it economic,
sexual, or physical. For an excellent analysis of how one's conception of the family is
inextricably linked to one's view of the appropriateness of different types of state involvement in medical treatment decisions, see Minow, supra note 59, at 946-50.
225. See C. GILLIGAN,
supra note 173, at 19.
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not through the rigid application of pre-ordained formulae and
rules-treating them as "a math problem with h u m a n ~ " ~ ~ ~ - b u t
rather through a response that will "sustain rather than sever connection."227 She articulates an alternative structure for conflict resolution in which the "awareness of the connection between people
gives rise to a recognition of responsibility for one another."228
Thus conversation itsegis the answer to the "fracture of human relationship," because it sustains and continues "a narrative of relationships that extend over time."229 In this light, autonomy must be
seen not as the ultimate virtue, the paramount right, but rather as
the source of an "illusory and dangerous quest,"230 an obstacle that
must be overcome, or at least bypassed, if the goal of communal
caring and compassion is to be attained.231
From a distinct, but related perspective, Dr. Jay Katz writes in The
Silent World of Doctor and Patient about the need for physicians to engage in conversation with their patients as the only way that the
legal doctrine of informed consent can be rendered meaningful.232
In Katz's view, if doctors discuss with their patients the risks and
benefits of alternative treatment, it will both enhance patient autonomy and yield better medical results, because the more information
the physician has from the patient, the better the diagnosis and
prognosis he will be able to reach.233 Thus, the practice of conversation with patients, seeing them not only as the physical embodiment of a collection of vital signs and symptoms, but as fellow
beings, both enhances individual self-determination and minimizes
the risk of an erroneous medical decision.234
Katz's work in this area finds support in the Society of General
Internal Medicine's Task Force for the Medical Interview and Related Skills. Researchers have found that when physicians are
trained to ask open-ended questions and to listen attentively, rather
than subjecting the patient to a verbal diagnostic check list, the result is likely to be both better health and a happier relationship between the doctor and patient. This happens, first, because in the
"art" of medicine, "[s]ome . . . healing . . . derives from the simple
communication of understanding, of positive regard, and of caring."235 Second, an attentive, open-ended interview leads both to
greater physician understanding of the patient's illness, desires, and
expectations, and to increased patient compliance with the physi226. Id. at 28.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 30.
229. See id. at 28.
230. See id. at 48.
231. Cf:id. at 17-19, 23, 48 (stressing the need to both develop and value the ability
to care for, and attach to, other human beings).
232. J. KATZ, THESILENTWORLDOF DOCTOR
AND PATXENT
84 (1984); see abo Katz,
supra note 84, at 142-43, 147, 160.
233. J. KATZ, supra note 232, at 86.
234. Id. at 84.
OF MEDICINE
235. Lipkin, The Medical Interuiew and Related Skills, in OFFICEPRACTICE
1287, 1293 (W. Branch 2d ed. 1987).
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cian's recommended course of treatment, because the physician
takes the time to explain the underlying reasons for her recommendations, and can tailor those recommendations to fit the particular
needs and habits of her patient.2S6
The Task Force also found that an emphasis on conversation is
critical not only for dying patients, but for their families as well. Being candid and concrete with the family about the dying process,
while "[fJraming what is being done as 'care' rather than as 'giving
up' can transform the experience from a nightmare to a final act of
love, caring, and courage."237
Substantial support for a conversation-based model of substitute
decisionmaking for incompetent patients is also found in the writings of Dr. Elizabeth Kubler-Ross, who has emphasized that dying is
a process. Kubler-Ross has found that the dying process consists of
stages through which an individual patient will often pass, including
denial, anger, bargaining, depression, acceptance, and eventual
peace.238 Each of these stages is an aspect of the conversation in
which a patient engages with her family, friends, and physicians in
regard to her impending death. In the case of an incompetent patient who cannot communicate with physicians and loved ones, it is
the process of discussion among the family and doctors, of'taking
time for mutual and caring interaction, that will lead to a better,
more humane, decision being made, as well as greater acceptance
and peace of mind among the participants.
Finally, the conversation model of substitute decisionmaking finds
support in the rapidly expanding literature on alternative dispute
resolution. Alternative dispute resolution, which includes negotiation, arbitration, and mediation, along with many hybrid f0rms,2~9is
seen by its proponents as providing many advantages over litigation
as a means of resolving controversies. These include: (1) the
strengthening of ongoing relationships;240 (2) the increased sense of
self-determination that comes from the disputants working out a
resolution of a difficult problem t0gether,2~lrather than having it
imposed from outside, as in adjudication; (3) the enhanced understanding of the other person's situation;242 and (4) the ability to vent
emotions and to discuss issues not directly related to the dispute at
hand.243 Each of these advantages supports the conversation model
236. , Branch, supra note 130, at 359.
237. Lipkin. supra note 235, at 1303.
238. See E. K~~BLER-ROSS,
ONDEATHAND DYING38-137 (1970).
239. S. GOLDBERG,
E. GREEN& F. SANDER,
DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
7-10 (1985).
240. Id. at 10.
241. See id. at 7.
242. McEwen & Maiman, Small Claim Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment, 33
ME. L. REV.237, 238-39 (1981).
243. Id.
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of substitute decisionmaking.
First, when the parties to a controversy have an ongoing
relationship, as is almost always so with family members, and is frequently the case with the family and the physician,
it is im~ortantto have the ~artiesseek to work out their own solution, for such a solution is more likely to be acceptable to them
than an imposed solution and hence more long-lasting. . . .
[Mlediation [in particular] encourages a restructuring of the underlying relationship so as to eliminate or mitigate the source of
conflict, rather than simply addressing each manifestation of conflict as an isolated event.244
Second, the enhanced sense of self-determination that can result
from the participant-controlled give-and-take of alternative dispute
resolution has a twofold virtue: it comports with the autonomy
model's goal of achieving individual self-actualization and it also
leads to greater satisfaction on the part of all participants with the
resolution that is ultimately reached.
A recent study of small claims court mediation in Maine found
that those persons who participated in mediation, and thus played
an active part in the decisionmaking process, were much more satisfied with the ultimate result and more likely to adhere to the decision reached than were traditional litigants, who often viewed
themselves as the mere object of the judge's d e c i ~ i o n m a k i n g .The
~~~
authors of the study suggested that, in part, this enhanced participant support for a decision reached via alternative dispute resolution may stem from the opportunities that mediation provides for
gaining insight into the other party's situation and the validity of his
viewpoint. In addition, because it is a less structured process than
adjudication, mediation gives the parties the chance to air important
emotional concerns and to discuss other issues which might not be
considered legally relevant.24G Hence, although mediation took
slightly more time than adjudication, it also led to increased satisfaction with the decisionmaking process, greater compliance with the
settlement eventually reached, and the continuation of the parties'
long-term, ongoing relationship when one existed.247

B.

The Conversation Model in Practice

In the case of substitute decisionmaking for the incompetent, incurably ill adult, an alternative dispute resolution process holds out
the same potential for continuing and strengthening the relationship of the participants, increasing satisfaction and compliance with
the resolution reached, and helping the parties deal with the sadness
and emotional upheaval that inevitably attends a decision to
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from a hopelessly
ill individual. These advantages are present in the procedure
244.
245.
246.
247.

S. GOLDBERG,
E. GREEN,
& F. SANDER,
supra note 239, at 10.
McEwen & Maiman, supra note 242, at 263-64.
Id. at 239, 256.
Id. at 263-64.
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envisioned by the New Jersey Supreme Court in C o n r ~ yPeter,249
,~~~
andJobes,250 in the process by which a designated treatment agent
discusses the patient's condition and prognosis with the attending
physician,25' and, to a limited extent, in the provisions for less formal decisionmaking enacted by ten states in their natural death
acts.252
In order to achieve a viable process of decisionmaking for the incurably ill, incompetent patient based on conversation, mutual respect, and responsibility, a number of changes-legal and medicalmust occur. First and foremost, state legislatures must be persuaded to enact statutes permitting competent adults to designate a
medical treatment agent to make decisions on their behalf should
they become incompetent and incurably ill. Such laws promote individual self-determination and autonomy by permitting the competent adult to nominate in advance of illness and incompetency a
treatment agent whom she trusts to make decisions for her based on
the agent's knowledge of her life, moral values, and preferences.
The advance designation of such a treatment agent leads both to
peace of mind on the part of the competent adult, and at the same
time enhances the accuracy of the treatment decision that is made.
Because the treatment agent must engage in conversation with the
patient's physician concerning the patient's present condition and
long-run prognosis, all relevant information can be brought to bear
in the decisionmaking process. The treatment decision that the
physician and the treatment agent ultimately make can therefore be
tailored both to the patient's medical situation and her moral value
system.
It is critical that the designated treatment agent be authorized to
act on the patient's behalf whenever he is incompetent and incurably ill. As noted earlier,253 to require that a patient be terminally ill
before his living will or other advance treatment directive can become operative deprives many hopelessly ill people of the salutary
effects of an advance directive, condemning them to a prolonged
and often painful dying process.
At the same time, legislatures should enact substitute decisionmaking procedures for those patients who have not executed an
advance treatment directive. Such procedures should be simple and
informal, as in those states whose natural death acts currently
provide for such a procedure.254 However, these procedures should
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

98 N.J.321,486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
108 NJ. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
See supra notes 131-43 and accompanying
See supra notes 215-21 and accompanying
See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying
See supra notes 215-21 and accompanying

text.
text.
text.
text.
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also be accompanied by safeguards, like those enunciated by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in Conroy 255 andJobes, 25G that will ensure
that an accurate diagnosis and prognosis has been made, that the
family is truly representing the patient's interests, and that those patients without close family members o r friends to act on their behalf
are not abandoned.257 At the same time, these procedures, like the
statutes authorizing the designation of a medical treatment agent,
should be be broad enough to include all incurably ill patients, not
only those whose conditions meet a strict definition of "terminal
illness."
Such a comprehensive, informal substitute decisionmaking procedure, with adequate safeguards against ill-advised, uninformed, or
improperly motivated substitute decisions, serves all the goals of the
conversation model. It is private, it is capable of a speedier and yet
more complete resolution of the issue, and it permits more giveand-take, more development of understanding in reaching a decision. Because each member of the decisionmaking group is better
informed about the ingredients of the decision, the risk of erroneous decisionmaking is significantly r e d u ~ e d . 2 5This
~
in turn leaves
the participants more satisfied, and thus, more likely to comply with
the decision that is reached. One can only wonder what would have
happened in the Brophy case if Patricia Brophy and her husband's
physicians had spent more time talking and less time litigating.
Would not the precise result the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court reached-recognition of Brophy's right to refuse treatment
and his transfer to the care of physicians who were willing to remove
his gastrostomy tube-have been achieved earlier, and at much less
financial and emotional cost to all persons involved?
As a result of a shared decisionmaking process, individual participants are able to view each other not as adversaries, but as partners
in reaching the resolution of a difficult problem. Then, after a decision is made, there is not enmity, but connection. This paves the
way for future relations of mutual respect, rather than malpractice
litigation, or rifts within the family. Accordingly, just as is the case
with alternative dispute resolution, the process of conversation, of
structuring a decisionmaking model on the basis of human connection rather than on a hierachy of rights and rules, enhances both the
quality of the decision made and the participants' acceptance of it.
In addition to legislative changes permitting conversational decisionmaking, medical education also must become more sensitive to
the ethical issues involved in making decisions for the incurably ill,
and more responsive to the need for conversation in the process of
255. 98 NJ. 321,486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
256. 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
257. Corzroq, 98 N.J. at 374-85, 486 A.2d at 1237-42; see also supra notes 198-209 and
accompanying text. However, it would not seem necessary to appoint a guardian in the
ordinary case. Seee.g., In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365,372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (stating
that in the case of a young child, the parents need not always qualify as legal guardians;
the parents' decision, supported by competent medical advice, is ordinarily sufficient).
258. See Branch, supra note 130, at 359.
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reaching those decisions. In particular, medical schools must confront directly the difficulties that inhere in our classical hierarchical
relationship between doctor and patient. Just as the doctrine of
informed consent has as its goal greater participation by the patient
in his own medical care as a means of achieving more medically correct and more personally satisfying decisions, so too we must instill
in medical students and practicing physicians the need to be open in
discussing the difficult issues of death and dying, to take time with
the incurably ill patient and his family, and to actively involve them
in the decisionmaking process.259
Instead of relegating medical ethics, psychosocial aspects of patient care, and the art and science of the medical interview to a minor, elective place in the curriculum, medical schools must give
these subjects a place in student studies commensurate with their
importance in the practice of medicine, integrating them fully into
~~
the type of curricular change that
the c u r r i c ~ l u m . 2Exemplifying
is both necessary and possible, in 1988 Harvard University Medical
School introduced a mandatory, comprehensive first-year course addressing numerous issues in the doctor-patient relationship, including informed consent, the patient interview, and ethical issues in
death and dying.Z61
Concomitantly with this new emphasis on the psychosocial aspects of climate practice, medical schools must also inform their students about the legal aspects of substitute decisionmaking for the
incurably ill. Both students and practicing physicians must be
taught about living wills, advance designations of medical treatment
agents, and, other legal tools available to enhance the patient's
control over his own dying whenever possible.262
259. This is but one of many reasons why it is appropriate to rethink our private and
state financial mechanisms for physician reimbursement, so that doctors are able to
charge a reasonable fee for the time involved in making decisions to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment. In addition, Dr. William T. Branch, one of the leading
proponents of the attentive, open-ended interview, argues that not only must physicians
find the time to engage in real conversation with patients and their families, but that
such time is actually cost-effective. He notes
[Olnce these skills are practiced-and become truly integrated into the doctor's repertoire--enhanced interest in and ability to deal with patients' feelings saves time in the long run, because patients talk to their doctors more
freely and cooperatively, their expectations are more fully met, compliance
improves, and misunderstandings and disagreements lessen.
Branch, srcpra note 130, at 358-59.
260. Since the early 1980s, the impetus for reform of American medical education
has grown. Critics generally agree on what is wrong with modem medical education,
although they often have disparate views on how best to remedy these deficiencies. See
Bok, srlpra note 32, at 32, 34-45, 70.
261. Telephone interview with Dr. William Branch, Harvard University Medical
School (July 25, 1988). This new course accounts for 66 hours in the reformed medical
school curriculum, compared with one hour previously.
262. Nursing educators must make similar curricular changes, as nurses are the priHeinonline - - 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
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It is also necessary for members of the public, as well as lawyers
and health care professionals, to educate themselves about the
advantages of designating a treatment agent to make health care decisions. Competent adults need to plan for their dying and discuss
their treatment preferences openly, in advance of illness and incompetency, with close friends and family. By encouraging such conversation, we can also foster both individual dignity and human
connection and caring.
Finally, and most important, the judiciary must take a hands-off
approach. Our zeal for error-free decisionmaking should not lead
us to believe that judicial intrusion in this area is either inevitable,
infallible, or desirable. Ultimately, we must recognize that the
courts are simply not the place for resolution of these most intimate
and personal issues. It is not judges but family members, acting out
of compassion, not dispassion, who are the most appropriate persons to ease their loved ones' passage from life to death.
mary caregivers in the hospital setting, almost always having much more contact with the
patient and his family than the physician.
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